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1.1 The Research Problem 
Subchapter S of the Internal Revenue Code was created fifty yearsago as a 
mechanism for providing small businesses with a tax advantage. This advantage was 
meant to allow small firms to more effectively compete with larger corporations.  
Statements to Congress indicate that banks that receive this tax advantage pass th  benefit 
onto small businesses through increased credit availability (Blankenship, 2008; Bright, 
2001). 
Since 1997, banks are allowed to convert to this organizational form if they meet 
the requirements set forth in the statute.  Every year banks continue to switch to this 
status and de novo banks enter into this status.1  Due to the passage of the Sarbanes-
Oxley Act of 2002 banks have other reasons, such as cost savings and reduced exposure 
to regulation, to reduce their size and operate under this newly avai able organizational 
form (SOX, 2002).2  In addition, this tax benefit provides commercial banks the 
opportunity to be on a more level playing field with credit unions. 
                                                
1De novo banks will not be included in the sample of Subchapter S commercial banks due to the differenc 
in the performance in the initial years of operation (Brislin and Santomero, 1991; De Young and Nolle, 
1996; De Young, 1999). 
2Under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, a company c  be considered private and avoid Sarbanes-
Oxley requirements if the company has fewer than 300 shareholders; or fewer than 500 shareholders and 
less than $10 million in total assets for each of its last three fiscal years. 
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Though many banks convert to this status, there are many eligibl banks which 
choose not to convert to this organizational form.  There is an adequate amount of 
research on S corporations in various industries, but due to the fairly recent eligibility of 
financial institutions to this tax status, there is little research on Subchapter S banks.  The 
research to date on Subchapter S banks tends to focus on the characteristics of banks that 
convert to this status.  These studies analyze variables such as ROE, dividend payments, 
bank size, location (urban v. rural), and other characteristics for predictiv  purposes.   
However, the purpose of this legislative act is yet to be investigated.  Are these tax 
savings provided to Subchapter S banks being channeled through to entities such as small 
businesses, including those in the agriculture industry, through an increase in loan 
activity?  The importance of these small banks to small businesses i  critical to our 
economy and is documented in the literature (Berger et al., 2005; Berger and Frame, 
2007; Berger and Udell, 1995; Craig and Hardee, 2007; Ely and Robinson, 2001; Strahan
and Weston, 1996).  Recently, it was reemphasized by the testimony of Federal Reserve 
Governor Mishkin (2008) who noted the importance of small banks in utilizing 
relationship lending and extending credit to small businesses during t bulent economic 
conditions. 
1.2 Purpose of the Research 
The purpose of this study is to investigate the important question, what are the 
banks doing with the tax advantage provided by their Subchapter S status?  Are they 
passing these benefits on to their customers in the form of increased credit availability?  
If not, are the tax savings staying within the banking organization as increased capital 
through retention of earnings, an increase in officers and employees’ salaries, or 
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increased dividends for owners?  The main concern and the policy issue of this 
investigation is if these tax savings are being channeled through increased lending 
activities to the banks’ local community including small businesses, for whose benefit the 
original legislation was intended (Mishkin, 2008).  I evaluate if Subchapter S banks have 
significant differences in their operating characteristics po t conversion versus a control 
group of Subchapter C banks.    I investigate some of the unique characteristics of 
Subchapter S banks and evaluate if their lending relationships are significantly different 
from the control Subchapter C banks due to this preferential tax treatment  
1.3 Results of the Research 
 An event study approach with a unique matching technique provides a more 
thorough evaluation of conversion by banks to Subchapter S tax status.  Empirical 
analysis of abnormal performance provides insight into how banks are distribut ng their 
tax savings from converting to Subchapter S tax status.  Results indicate banks are 
utilizing the tax benefit primarily to increase dividends.  The increase in dividends is 
shown to be significantly greater than what is necessary to offset the increase in taxes 
incurred by shareholders.  Results of negative abnormal performance in many of the 
lending categories indicate banks decrease the more risky small business and agricultural 
lending after converting to Subchapter S.  Negative abnormal performance in salaries 
possibly indicates salaries previously were used to extract funds rom the banks to avoid 
double taxation.  The negative abnormal performance in retained earnings corresponds 




1.4 Structure of the Research  
 Chapter II is a literature review that describes the progression of Subchapter S 
legislation and the legal requirements of electing this status.  Chapter III is an analysis 
and overview of previous studies that investigate the characteristi s and performance of 
banks that convert to Subchapter S status.  Chapter IV is a discussion of the importance 
of funneling the increased tax savings to small businesses.  Chapter V is a description of 
the data and methodology for the empirical analysis and contains the theoretical 
framework and a set of testable hypotheses.  Chapter VI contains the results of an 
empirical comparison of banks that convert to Subchapter S status and a matched control 
sample consisting of banks that do not convert.  The empirical analysis is an event study 
utilizing accounting data.  Finally, Chapter VII is a discussion of the policy implications 





LEGAL REQUIREMENTS FOR SUBCHAPTER S CORPORATIONS 
 
Subchapter S of the Internal Revenue Code (IRC) was established as an 
alternative form of business organization by Congress under the Tecnical Amendments 
Act of 1958, which is a revision to the IRC of 1954 (TAA, 1958).  The purpose of this 
hybrid form of business organization is to reduce the tax burden on small businesses by 
allowing them to operate as a corporation but pay taxes at the individual owner level like 
a partnership.   
An S corporation is defined by the Internal Revenue Code as, “with respect to any 
taxable year, a small business corporation for which an election underSection 1362(a) is 
in effect for such year” (U.S.C., §1361(a)(1)).  This organizational form receives the 
benefits of both the corporate organizational form and the partnership form. Thus, an S 
corporation is allowed to operate with limited liability like a C corporation while 
receiving the benefit of avoiding double taxation.  C corporations are n med after 
Subchapter C of the Internal Revenue Code and are taxed as a separate business entity 
(U.S.C., §311).  S corporations do not pay the federal corporate income tax but instead all 
taxes are paid at the level of the individual owner.  For these eligibl  S corporations, their 
income and losses are passed-through (sometimes referred to as flowed-through) to 
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their shareholders on a pro rata basis, similar to the partnership rules.  The individual 
shareholders are then taxed on their share through their individual income tax returns.  
Unlike the partnership organizational form, the shareholders of S corporations are 
typically not subject to self-employment taxes on their distributive shares.   Therefore, 
the company’s profits are not subject to double taxation (U.S.C., §1366(a)(1)(A)).3 
Due to the tax savings associated with S corporations and the increased number of 
regulations corporations are required to follow, more organizations are converting to 
Subchapter S every year as a cost saving mechanism.  Scholes and Wolfson (1992) find 
that as corporate costs increase, so does the benefit from the tax savings and the number 
of pass-through entities such as S corporations.  
Table 1 provides a simplified illustration of the difference in taxation of a C 
corporation and an S corporation. As indicated in Panel A and Panel B, the tax advantage 
of Subchapter S increases as the dividend payout increases.  Panel C d Panel D 
illustrate the implication of individual and corporate tax rates on Subchapter S status.  
The advantage of Subchapter S increases as the corporate tax rate e ceeds the individual 
tax rate.  Panel E provides an illustration of the current tax si uation.  The reduction in the 
dividend tax rate reduces, but does not eliminate the tax advantage of Subchapter S. 
To summarize, the Subchapter S owners are not held personally liable for d bts, 
obligations, and judgments of the business and the profits of the business are taxed only 
once at the federal income tax rate applicable to the individual shareholders.  The highest 
marginal rate for individual shareholders in 2008 is 35 percent, a significant decrease 
from the previous high of 91 percent when Subchapter S tax status firs  became available 
(Refer to Table 2).   
                                                
3 Some states do require a state corporate income tax. 
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Table 1:  Illustration of Subchapter S Tax Effect 
    
Two banks with pre-tax income of $1,000,000.  One converts to Subchapter S the other 
 remains under Subchapter C of the IRC.   
    
Panel A:  Assumes a 100% Dividend Payout    
 Subchapter S Subchapter C  
Pre-tax Income $1,000,000  $1,000,000   
Corporate Tax Paid $0 $350,000   
After Tax Corporate Income (Loss) $1,000,000  $650,000   
    
Dividend Payout $1,000,000  $650,000   
Individual Tax Paid $350,000  $227,500   
After Tax Individual Income (Loss) $650,000  $422,500   
Cash Position of Individual $650,000 $422,500  
    
Total Tax $350,000  $577,500   
    
    
Panel B:  Assumes a 0% Dividend Payout   
 Subchapter S Subchapter C  
Pre-tax Income $1,000,000  $1,000,000   
Corporate Tax Paid 0 $350,000   
After Tax Corporate Income (Loss) $1,000,000  $650,000   
    
Dividend Payout $0  $0   
Individual Tax Paid $350,000  $0   
After Tax Individual Income (Loss) $650,000  $650,000   
Cash Position of Individual ($350,000)  $0   
    
Total Tax $350,000  $350,000   
    
    
Panel C:  Assumes a 50% Dividend Payout but a Corporate Tax Rate of 20% and an  
                 Individual Tax Rate of 50%. 
 Subchapter S Subchapter C 
Pre-tax Income $1,000,000  $1,000,000  
Corporate Tax Paid 0 $200,000  
After Tax Corporate Income (Loss) $1,000,000  $800,000  
   
Dividend Payout $500,000 $400,000 
Individual Tax Paid $500,000  $200,000 
After Tax Individual Income (Loss) $500,000  $600,000  
Cash Position of Individual $0  $200,000  
   
Total Tax $500,000  $400,000  
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Panel D:  Assumes a 50% Dividend Payout but a Corporate Tax Rate of 50% and an  
                 Individual Tax Rate of 20%. 
 Subchapter S Subchapter C  
Pre-tax Income $1,000,000  $1,000,000   
Corporate Tax Paid $0 $500,000   
After Tax Corporate Income (Loss) $1,000,000  $500,000   
    
Dividend Payout $500,000 $250,000  
Individual Tax Paid $200,000  $50,000  
After Tax Individual Income (Loss) $300,000  $200,000   
Cash Position of Individual $300,000  $200,000   
    
Total Tax $200,000 $550,000  
 
 
    
    
Panel E:  Assumes a 50% Dividend Payout, Corporate Tax Rate is 35%, Individual Tax Rate 
is 35%, Dividend Tax Rate is 15% 
 Subchapter S Subchapter C  
Pre-tax Income $1,000,000  $1,000,000   
Corporate Tax Paid $0 $350,000   
After Tax Corporate Income (Loss) $1,000,000  $650,000   
    
Dividend Payout $500,000 $325,000  
Individual Tax Paid $250,000  $48,750  
After Tax Individual Income (Loss) $250,000  $276,250   
Cash Position of Individual $250,000  $276,250   
    
Total Tax $250,000  $398,750   
  
    
Assumes all income received is taxed at the top margin l rate.  This ignores deductions, 
exemptions and the rates below the top marginal rate.  The highest marginal rate for both 
individuals and corporations is assumed to be 35% in Panels A and B. 
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1913 7.00% 1945 94.00% 1977 70.00% 
1914 7.00% 1946 86.45% 1978 70.00% 
1915 7.00% 1947 86.45% 1979 70.00% 
1916 15.00% 1948 82.13% 1980 70.00% 
1917 67.00% 1949 82.13% 1981 69.13% 
1918 77.00% 1950 91.00% 1982 50.00% 
1919 73.00% 1951 91.00% 1983 50.00% 
1920 73.00% 1952 92.00% 1984 50.00% 
1921 73.00% 1953 92.00% 1985 50.00% 
1922 56.00% 1954 91.00% 1986 50.00% 
1923 56.00% 1955 91.00% 1987 38.50% 
1924 46.00% 1956 91.00% 1988 28.00% 
1925 25.00% 1957 91.00% 1989 28.00% 
1926 25.00% 1958 91.00% 1990 31.00% 
1927 25.00% 1959 91.00% 1991 31.00% 
1928 25.00% 1960 91.00% 1992 31.00% 
1929 24.00% 1961 91.00% 1993 39.60% 
\1930 25.00% 1962 91.00% 1994 39.60% 
1931 25.00% 1963 91.00% 1995 39.60% 
1932 63.00% 1964 77.00% 1996 39.60% 
1933 63.00% 1965 70.00% 1997 39.60% 
1934 63.00% 1966 70.00% 1998 39.60% 
1935 63.00% 1967 70.00% 1999 39.60% 
1936 79.00% 1968 75.25% 2000 39.60% 
1937 79.00% 1969 77.00% 2001 38.60% 
1938 79.00% 1970 71.75% 2002 38.60% 
1939 79.00% 1971 70.00% 2003 35.00% 
1940 81.10% 1972 70.00% 2004 35.00% 
1941 81.00% 1973 70.00% 2005 35.00% 
1942 88.00% 1974 70.00% 2006 35.00% 
1943 88.00% 1975 70.00% 2007 35.00% 
1944 94.00% 1976 70.00% 2008 35.00% 
Note:  This table contains a number of simplifications and ignores a number 
of factors, such as a maximum tax on earned income f 50 percent when the 
top rate was 70 percent and the current increase in rates due to income-related 
reductions in value of itemized deductions. 
 
2.1 Progression of the Individual Tax Rate 
Tax rate changes have important implications for banks when considering election 
of Subchapter S status.  The benefits of converting to Subchapter S status decline when 
the individual income tax rate increases.  Currently the highest individual income tax rate 
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is lower than the highest corporate income tax rate, but as the tax rate changes so do the 
incentives and number of organizations opting to elect Subchapter S status.  
The top marginal individual tax rate was extremely high during the 1950s through 
1970s, ranging from 91 percent to 70 percent.  President Ronald Reagan’s admi i tration 
introduced the Economic Recovery Tax Act of 1981 (ERT, 1981) which brought the top 
individual marginal tax rate down to 50 percent in 1982.  Subchapter S status became 
even more favorable after President Reagan initiated and passed the Tax Reform Act of 
1986.  This Act reduced the highest individual tax rate from 50 percent to 28 percent, 
well below the top corporate federal rate, which declined from 50 percent to 35 percent.  
Also, during 1986 the alternative minimum tax rate (AMT) for corporati ns was set at 20 
percent (TRA, 1986).  This greatly increased the benefit to S corporations because S 
corporations are not subject to the AMT and they also avoid the additional administrative 
duties and fees associated with computing this tax.    
Tax law changes under President George H.W. Bush’s administration increased 
the top individual marginal income tax rate up to 31 percent under the Omnibus Budget 
Reconciliation Act of 1990 (OBRA, 1990).  President Clinton further increased the 
individual tax rate to 39.6 percent, thus reducing the benefit of electing Subchapter S 
status (OBRA, 1993).  The highest individual marginal tax rate remained at 39.6 percent 
until George W. Bush took office and initiated his tax cut plan under the Economic 
Growth and Tax Relief Reconciliation Act of 2001, which reduced the top income rate 
down to the current rate of 35 percent (EGTRRA, 2001). 4 
 
                                                
4 The tax rate reductions created by President George W. Bush are set to expire in 2010 unless legislation is 
created to extend them (JGTRRA, 2003).  
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2.2 Comparison of Organizational Forms 
S corporations have many characteristics that C corporations have, and thus they 
are subject to many of the same requirements.  They are required to conform to state laws 
and file an article of incorporation with the Secretary of State, the shareholders are able to 
vote on major issues, and the organization holds directors and shareholders meetings.  In 
addition both organizational forms benefit from an unlimited life (U.S.C., §1371).  The 
major difference between these organizational forms is taxation.  The owners of S 
corporations are taxed on the profits of the corporations, whether or not the profits are 
distributed.  Thus they are taxed on income they may never receive, whereas a C 
corporation’s shareholders are only taxed on income when it is received as dividends 
(U.S.C., §1366(a)(1)).   
S corporations are similar to another hybrid organizational form, the Limited 
Liability Corporation (LLC).  Although both forms receive limited liability and tax 
advantages, there are differences in the formation requirements.  S corporations are 
limited to 100 shareholders and all must be in resident status (U.S.C., §1361(b)(1)).  
Conversely, U.S. residency is not required of LLC shareholders and the number of 
owners is not limited (U.S.C., §301).  LLCs are more flexible with fewer restrictions on 
the types of eligible owners and in their distribution of profits.  They can be owned by C 
corporations, S corporations, trusts, and LLCs partnerships.  Under LLC requirements 
income is not passed-through on a pro rata basis but rather is distributed based upon an 
agreement plan set up by the members/owners (U.S.C., §702).  Both S corporations and 
Limited Liability Corporations provide a tax savings to the owners.  Sole proprietorships 
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and straight partnership organizational forms receive the tax saving  but do not receive 
limited liability (U.S.C., § 63).   
There are differences among the various organizational forms, but there are also 
differences within the organizational forms.  The benefits of electing Subchapter S status 
are not equal in all states.  Some states do not recognize S corporations as pass-through 
entities.  In these states, organizations filing under Subchapter S experience double 
taxation with respect to state corporate taxes.5   
2.3 Requirements for Filing Under Subchapter S of the Internal Revenue Code 
 The original 1958 Subchapter S requirements have undergone some modificati ns 
over the years to allow more companies to elect this organizational form.  In order to 
convert to Subchapter S status under the 1958 legislative ruling, an org ization is 
required to meet certain conditions.  One requirement for conversion is all shareholders 
must agree and required documentation must be filed with the Internal Revenue Service 
within two months and 15 days after the first day of the taxable year.   If at any time the 
Subchapter S election is lost, the firm could not re-elect the status for five years unless 
the loss is unintended (U.S.C., §1361(b)(3)(D)).   
The 1958 tax provisions included the following requirements for establishing and 
maintaining Subchapter S status (U.S.C., §1361(b)(1)):  (1) The corporation is a domestic 
corporation, (2) The corporation is not a member of an affiliated group of corporations, 
(3) The corporation does not have more than one class of stock,6 (4) The corporation does 
not have more than ten shareholders, (5) The corporation’s shareholders are individuals 
                                                
5 These states include California, Connecticut, Delaware, Louisiana, Michigan, New Hampshire, New 
Jersey, North Carolina, Tennessee., Utah, and Vermont. 
6 A corporation is treated as having only one class of stock if all the outstanding shares have identical rights 
to distribution and liquidation proceeds.  In addition, S corporations are restricted from issuing prefer d 
stock (U.S.C., §1361(b)(D)). 
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or estates, but are not another organization, and (6) The corporation does not have a 
shareholder who is a nonresident alien.  Of these provisions, the definition of eligible 
shareholders and the accounting techniques allowed are the major stumbling blocks 
which prevented financial institutions from converting to Subchapter S status.   
The first change to the legislation occurred in 1976 when the number of 
shareholders provision was increased to 25, but little else changed (TAA, 1976).  
Congress made some additional transformations to the tax code through the Subchapter S 
Revision Act of 1982.  This Act allowed S corporations to conform more clsely to the 
partnership taxation provisions, but without all the complications (SSRA, 1982).  This 
allowed S corporations to become pass-through entities without all the ex ra rules 
associated with partnerships.  This Act also increased the maximum number of 
shareholders to 35 (U.S.C., §1361(b)(1)(A)). 
Even with these revisions, banks and other financial institutions were not able to 
elect Subchapter S status until 1997 following the introduction of the Small Business Job 
Protection Act of 1996 (SBJPA, 1996).  This Act allowed financial institutions to become 
eligible to elect this status if they met certain requirements and do not use the reserve 
method of accounting.  This Act also liberalized many of the previous restrictions on S 
corporations.   The 1997 Act expanded the eligibility requirements for hareholders by 
amending the IRC to increase the maximum number of shareholders from 35 to 75 
(U.S.C., §1361(b)(1)(A)).7   Charitable, tax-exempt organizations and certain non-
individual retirement plans became eligible to be S corporation shareholders (U.S.C., 
§1361(b)(2)).  In addition, S corporations are eligible to own 80 percent or more of 
another C corporation and are allowed to have a subsidiary of another S corporation if it 
                                                
7 Husband and wife count as one shareholder. 
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was 100 percent owned (U.S.C., §1361(b)(3)).8  S corporations are allowed to create an 
employee stock ownership plan and the IRS provided more flexibility for elections, 
audits, and litigation requirements.  The new provisions allowed the sale by an IRA trust 
to an IRA beneficiary of bank stock and provided adjustments for earning distributions 
which occurred in loss years.   While these new provisions increased the attractiveness of 
Subchapter S and allowed many financial institutions to convert to this status, others are 
still unable to convert due to existing provisions. 
The Jobs and Growth Tax Relief Reconciliation Act of 2003 was signed into law 
on May 28, 2003 by President George W. Bush changing the way double taxation 
impacts corporate decision making.  This law reduced the maximum tax to 15 percent for 
qualifying dividends paid after January 2003 (JGTRRA, 2003).  Dividends qualify for 
this lower tax if from a domestic corporation or a qualified foreign corporation, but not if 
they are received from a tax-exempt corporation, an interest payment, or if paid on stock 
owned by an employee stock ownership plan.  Under the Act, dividends are taxed at 15% 
instead of taxed as ordinary income (JGTRRA, 2003).  This change in tax law does not 
eliminate double taxation, but rather reduced the advantage that S corporati ns h d over 
C corporations.  This tax change is set to expire on December 31, 2010 when the tax on 
dividends will revert back to that of ordinary income. 
Since some of the benefits and effectiveness of Subchapter S status decreased due 
to the Jobs and Growth Tax Relief Reconciliation Act, Congress relaxed the restrictions 
on S corporations in order to provide better incentives to small businesses.  The 
American Jobs Creation Act of 2004 (AJCA, 2004) changed the eligibility requirements 
                                                
8 A qualified Subchapter S subsidiary is basically a 100% owned corporation whose identity is ignored for 
tax purposes so that its assets, liabilities, income, etc. are treated as owned by the S corporation parent 
company. 
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for shareholders by increasing the number of eligible shareholders to 100 and expanding 
the definition of a shareholder.  The 2004 Act expanded the definition of who qualifies as 
a shareholder to include up to six generations of lineal descendants, e.g. a husband, wife, 
and a great grandparent would all count together as one shareholder.  These incentives 
increased the number of organization qualified to elect Subchapter S status.  
Under the current Internal Revenue Code, as updated by the 2004 Amendment 
(AJCA, 2004), a corporation is eligible to elect Subchapter S status if it meets the 
following requirements: (1) The corporation is a domestic corporation, (2) The 
corporation has less than 100 shareholders, (3) The shareholders are a person, an estate or 
a trust, but not an organization, (4) Shareholders are domestic residents, and (5) The 
corporation issues only one class of stock (U.S.C., §1361(b)(1)).  Corporations are 
ineligible to file under Subchapter S, according to the Internal Revenu  Code if they are:  
(1) A financial institution which uses the reserve method of accounting for bad debts 
described in IRC, Section 585, (2) Operating as an insurance company subject to tax 
under Subchapter L, (3) A corporation which elects to be treated as a possessions 
corporation under IRC, Section 936, and (4) A current or former Domestic International 
Sales Corporation (U.S.C., §1361(b)(2)). 
2.4 Converting to Subchapter S of the Internal Revenue Code for Financial Institutions 
The Small Business Job Protection Act of 1996 first allowed financial i stitutions 
to elect Subchapter S status.  The American Jobs Creation Act of 2004 (AJCA, 2004) 
then made it easier for banks seeking Subchapter S status by modif ing the definition of 
shareholders and requirements for who qualifies as shareholders.  The primary 
restrictions that prevented financial institutions from opting into this organizational form 
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included using the reserve method of accounting for bad debts under IRC, Section 585 or 
exceeding the passive income limits.  Under the previous Internal Revenue Code’s 
provisions, interest income earned by banks was considered passive.9  On December 20, 
1996 the IRS redefined most interest income and classified it as active income, thus 
removing the barrier many financial institutions have with the passive income 
requirement (IRS, 1996).  The passive income limits are set at 25 percent of gross 
receipts.10  Amounts above this level are taxed at the highest federal level for income.  If 
this occurs in three consecutive years, the Subchapter S status is revoked by the IRS.  
This was a major change to the previous legislation and is crucial for banks to elect this 
organizational form.     
  Thus, the creation of this legislation allowed some banks to choose Subchapter S 
tax status beginning in 1997.    Another restriction preventing some banks and thrifts 
from converting to Subchapter S deals with their accounting technique.  Banks using the 
reserve method of accounting for loan losses are ineligible for Subchapter S election.  
Although this provision remains, banks are able to switch to the specific charge-off 
method and thus become eligible for Subchapter S election. 
The Tax Reform Act of 1986 requires large banks with assets greater th n $500 
million to use the specific charge-off method.  Smaller banks can choose this method or 
the experience reserve method, which is calculated using a six-year moving average of 
actual losses (TRA, 1986).  If a bank elects Subchapter S status and switches accounting 
methods, adjustments to the bank’s income will occur.  Under the current law if the 
                                                
9 The IRS defines passive income as an activity which the taxpayer does not materially participate (e.g. 
rental income, interest income, dividend income) 
10 If a Subchapter S corporation’s passive income is greater than 25 percent of gross receipts for three 
consecutive years, the institution is ineligible to remain as a Subchapter entity (U.S.C., §1362(d)(3).)   
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accounting change is made during the first tax year after election the bank may choose to 
take all adjustments in the last taxable year it was a C corporation (USTRA, 2007).  
Therefore, adjustments are taxed at the corporate level.11  A though, large banks use the 
correct method of accounting for eligibility to elect Subchapter S status, other provisions 
usually prevent them from qualifying for this status.  Meanwhile, small banks that are 
using the reserve method of accounting must switch to the specific-charge off method to 
become eligible to elect Subchapter S status.   
 Subchapter S status was created fifty years ago as a way to provide a tax 
advantage to small businesses.  Small businesses are deemed crucial to the U.S. economy 
and the legislation provided them a tax advantage to help them compete with larger 
corporations.  Small banks often site their strong community relationships.  Various 
banking groups request Congress to further loosen the restriction on Subchapter S status 
so that more small banks can become eligible to convert to Subchapter S s atus (White 
House Vetoes Relief for Community Banks, 2007; Preserving and Protecting Main Street 
USA, 2001).  Responding to a Presidential veto on less stringent Subchapter S 
requirements, the Chairwoman for the Committee on Small Business referenced the 
relationship between small banks and small businesses.  She stated, “Th se reforms 
would have ensured community banks are able to meet the needs of local business 
owners and promote further job creation.”  She continued by stating, “These reforms will 
make community banks’ national reach, local ties, and emphasis on small business and 
farm lending available to more customer in more areas” (White House Vetoes Relief for 
Community Banks, 2007).   Bankers cite the benefits small banks provide by extending 
                                                
11 Previously if the accounting change was made during the first year of election adjustments are considere  
in the taxes for both the shareholder and the corporation, but if the change was made prior to election 
adjustments are only taxed at the corporate level. 
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credit to their local communities, including small businesses in their arguments 
(Preserving and Protecting Main Street USA, 2001).  Recently, the Independent 
Community Bankers of America (ICBA), which represents 5,000 community banks, sent 
a memo to the Counselor to the Secretary of Treasury regarding “helping community 
banks increase small business lending.”    This memo focuses on Subchapter S tax reform 
(ICBA, 2009).  An ICBA representative testified before Congress discussing Subchapter 
S community banks and their lending to small business customers. Th conclusion of the 
testimony was the “ICBA believes reforming and simplifying onerous Subchapter S 
corporation rules will create a tax code that is small business friendly and improve 
community banks’ ability to meet the lending needs in their local communities” (S-corps: 
Recommended Reforms That Promote Parity, Growth and Development for Small 
Businesses, 2008).  This claim, that after conversion to Subchapter S s atus these banks 
are actually extending more credit to their local communities including small businesses 






CHARACTERISTICS AND PERFORMANCE OF SUBCHAPTER S BANKS:   
EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE 
 
Previous research focuses on the differences between Subchapter C banks and 
those that elect the new Subchapter S tax status.  Most of the research evaluates various 
characteristics of these organizations and develops models to predict which banks are 
more likely to convert based upon these characteristics.  Other res arch examines how 
these characteristics may change after conversion.  
Empirical analyses of the performance of Subchapter S banks are som what 
limited in scope and number.  Few published studies evaluate the characteristics of banks 
that convert to Subchapter S status.  Previous research usually focuses on a limited 
number of years after the election became possible and lacks an in-depth analysis of the 
consequences of this status on banks, their shareholders, and the communities they serve.  
Investigations that focus on election of Subchapter S status in the banking 
industry typically don’t evaluate differences that may occur throughout the years after 
conversion.  Hodder, McAnally, and Weaver (2003) evaluate the differences between 
early and late converters, but their sample only included three years of data.  Knowing 
the difference between banks that convert to Subchapter S status and those that remain 
Subchapter C banks may be of interest.  However, an important policy question involves 
the behavior of Subchapter S banks after conversion.  In particular, what happens to the
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tax subsidy for Subchapter S banks and precisely who is receiving the tax benefit? 
Harvey and Padget (2000), Hodder, McAnally, and Weaver (2003), Cyree, Hein, 
and Koch (2005), and Gilbert and Wheelock (2007) directly investigate the performance 
and characteristics of Subchapter S banks.  Previous investigations addre s the largest 
obstacles facing banks electing Subchapter S status and evaluate the characteristics of 
Subchapter S conversions. 
3.1 Characteristics of Banks Electing Subchapter S Status 
 
Subchapter S status is not equally beneficial for all commercial banks.  For 
example, if a bank focuses more on retained earnings and pays lower divid nds, the tax 
savings from converting to Subchapter S is much less significant.   Therefore, one of the 
primary characteristics of the banks that are most likely to convert to Subchapter S status 
are those banks that have higher dividend payments and positive pre-tax earnings.   Other 
characteristics may lead to additional benefits or costs to the converting bank, depending 
on the provisions. 
Hodder et al. (2003) and Cyree, et al. (2005) use logistic regression analysis to 
investigate the characteristics of banks most likely to convert to Subchapter S status.  
Hodder et al. (2003) analyze call report data and divide their sample into early (1997) and 
late (1998, 1999) converters to examine if firm characteristics are different between the 
two groups.  Cyree et al. (2005) also explore why more banks do not elect his seemingly 
more profitable tax status.  Similar to Hodder et al. (2003), Cyree et al. (2005) examine 
call report data, but extend the sample period to 1997-2003 and utilize a wider set of 
variables to include rural, urban, and de novo banks.  They aggregate the data from 1997-
2003, thus differences in the characteristics of banks between years is ignored and they 
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do not distinguish between early and late converts as in Hodder et al. (2003).  Harvey and 
Padget (2000) employ a sub sample of banks from the Kansas City Federal Reserve Bank 
District for the years 1997-1999 to evaluate the characteristics of Subchapter S banks.  
They exclude new banks opening after 1993 and those with assets greater than 1 billion.  
Gilbert and Wheelock (2007) compare averages of Subchapter S with all Subchapter C 
banks to evaluate differences in operating performance. 
3.1.1 Bank Size/Shareholders 
Most Subchapter S commercial banks are small, with asset sizes less than $1 
billion, because of legal restrictions.  These small banks accounted for 99.6 percent of the 
commercial banks that elected Subchapter S status in 1997 and 98.34 percent in 2007 
(Refer to Table 3).  As of June 2000, 95 percent of Subchapter S banks have total assets 
less than $250 million, with the average size of the converted banks being $63.2 million 
(Harvey and Padget, 2000).   
Table 3:  Subchapter S Banks by Year and Size 
Year 
No. of Subchapter S 
Commercial Banks 
No. of Large Subchapter S 
Banks (Assets > $1 billion) 
1997 596 2 
1998 1,035 3 
1999 1,279 5 
2000 1,433 7 
2001 1,622 7 
2002 1,785 7 
2003 1,941 8 
2004 2,046 15 
2005 2,152 25 
2006 2,255 31 
2007 2,345 39 
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A possible restriction to growth for banks that convert to Subchapter S status is 
due to the limitations on the number of shareholders and limitations on the class of stock, 
both of which potentially restrict banks’ access to external capital.12  Since these banks 
are restricted on the number of shareholders, they tend to have more fa ily connections 
because up to six lineal generations count as one shareholder (U.S.C., §1361(c)(B)(ii)).13  
This is consistent with findings that Subchapter S banks often are clos ly held (Cyree et 
al., 2005; Hodder et al., 2003).   
Harvey and Padget (2000) find that banks that convert to Subchapter S status have 
higher capital ratios prior to conversion.  Since the various Subchapter S restrictions will 
limit the ability these institutions have to gain access to external capital after conversion, 
banks maintain higher capital levels prior to conversion.  Thus banks that convert to 
Subchapter S status are typically banks with fewer growth opportunities and less need for 
external capital financing (Harvey and Padget, 2000; Hodder et al., 2003; Cyree et al., 
2005).  These findings coincide with the Subchapter S literature in other industries which 
suggests that conversion to Subchapter S status restricts an organization’s growth 
opportunities (Ayers et al., 1996).  
3.1.2 Dividends and Taxes 
Organizations which pay larger dividends and have higher pre-tax earnings are 
more likely to convert to Subchapter S status (Hodder et al., 2003; Harvey nd Padget, 
2000; Cyree et al., 2005).  Gilbert and Wheelock (2007) find that the profits of 
                                                
12Another area where the capital for banks is possibly restricted after electing Subchapter S status is with
the use of trust preferred stock. Trust preferred stock is primarily sold to large institutional investors and 
under the current provisions of Subchapter S status, this type of capital is limited to 25 percent of the banks 
capital stock (U.S.C., §1362(d)(3)(D)).   
13The limitations on obtaining external capital are possibly most restricting on small, family-owned banks.  
Capital often is already constrained in these banks because family members frequently are heavily invested 
and not willing to invest additional resources (Cyree et al., 2005). 
 23
Subchapter S banks exceed banks that remain as Subchapter C banks of similar size.  
They use the Uniform Bank Performance Report’s hypothetical tax rate conversions, 
which adjusts for earnings on tax advantaged securities and for the federal corporate 
income tax to evaluate the performance of Subchapter S banks.  They find Subchapter S 
banks consistently have higher pre-tax earnings, lower operating costs, and a higher 
dividend payout.14     
Because shareholders of C corporations experience double taxation, they only pay 
taxes on the dividends and don’t pay capital gains taxes until the shars are sold.  This 
allows shareholders to postpone their tax obligation to a more optimal time when they are 
able to better manage their income and pay a lower tax.  Due to the double taxation 
inherent in C corporations, these organizations may seek ways of decreasing their taxable 
income.  One method is to increase compensation to management.  The IRS examines 
compensation payments to determine if they are reasonable.  If they are not, they are 
reclassified as a non-deductible dividend and taxed at the dividend rate under the 2003 
tax changes.  Additionally, the IRS may choose to disallow the deduction and tax the 
compensation as ordinary income (JGTRRA, 2003).    Manager-owners of Subchapter S 
banks may prefer payments through dividends versus salaries due to the employment tax 
on salaries.  This could account for the lower operating expense at Subchapter S banks.  
However, salaries are an alternative for Subchapter C banks as a way of extracting funds 
from the bank without being penalized with double taxation.  Gilbert and Wheelock 
(2007) compare Subchapter S banks to Subchapter C banks’ personnel expense and do 
not find a significant difference between the two groups. 
                                                
14 They note one problem with using the UBPR conversion is it does not account for different state income 
taxes. 
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In addition to the corporate tax savings, S corporations are also exempt fro  the 
corporate Alternative Minimum Tax (AMT).15  Banks are typically subject to the AMT 
because they hold extensive tax-exempt securities which generate income subject to this 
tax.  Proxies often used for the bank’s AMT are the bank’s tax-exempt securities which 
are held by the banks for various reasons (Hodder et al., 2003; Cyree et al., 2005).  Banks 
hold these tax-exempt securities not only for tax reasons, but also for pledging 
requirements and to help strengthen community relations.  Banks with higher investment 
in these securities, and thus more AMT exposure are more likely to convert.  As 
anticipated, Cyree et al., (2005) and Hodder et al., (2003), find Subchapter S banks tend 
to have higher tax exempt securities.   
Another tax consequence for a bank considering electing Subchapter S s atus is 
state of incorporation.  Not all states equally recognize this tax status.  Several states 
impose a state corporate tax on the earnings of these organizations.  Therefore, in these 
states Subchapter S banks do not receive the same level of benefits as in other, 
Subchapter S friendly states.  Plesko (1994) finds, consistent with Hodder et al., (2003), 
that state taxes influence the conversion choice and banks in states with a state corporate 
tax are less likely to convert to Subchapter S status. Conversely, Cyree et al. (2005) do 
not find Subchapter S banks in friendly states are significantly different from Subchapter 
S banks in states where a state corporate tax is present.  
3.1.3 Age 
Cyree, et al. (2005) argue banks will choose Subchapter S status when the 
benefits from taxes exceeds the cost of converting or the cost of an election for de novo 
                                                
15 Since the income from Subchapter S corporations is pas ed-through to the shareholders, shareholders 
could still be subject to the individual AMT.   
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banks.  Cyree et al. (2005) also find that de novo banks typically don’t choose Subchapter 
S status (they represented less than ten percent of the sample in 2003).  This is not 
surprising since the primary advantage of electing Subchapter S status is the tax benefit 
and this does not become evident until the bank is profitable.  Since most de novo banks 
are not profitable their first few years, it is not surprising only a small percentage have 
elected this status.  This agrees with the findings of Cryee and Wansley (2002) who find 
the return on assets for a de novo bank typically doesn’t meet industry ave age for 
approximately 7.5 years.  DeYoung and Hasan (1998) find de novo banks don’t becme 
efficient until nine years of operation.   Using panel data of de novo banks, Huyser (1986) 
finds a difference between de novo banks and established banks as far out as 13 years 
past establishment date.  Hunter and Srinivasan (1990) find de novo banks underperform 
seven years after being established.  Finally, Brislin and Santomero (1991) find financial 
statements are quite volatile for de novo banks, specifically during the first few months of 
operation.   
3.1.4 Unrealized Gains 
Unrealized gains that exist at conversion to Subchapter S status are taxed at both 
the corporate and shareholder level.  In addition, gains realized within 10 years of 
conversion are double taxed, since the bank actually earned these gains while operating 
as a C corporation (U.S.C., §1374(d)(7)).  S corporations must pay tax on unrealized 
gains when realized, whereas C corporations don’t have to pay until the earnings are paid 
out to individuals and thus these gains are delayed (U.S.C., §1374(d)(1)).  For banks 
electing Subchapter S status, these unrealized gains are typically associated with their 
available-for-sale securities.  The higher the gain on the available-for-sale securities in 
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the banks portfolio, the less likely the bank is to convert.  Although predicted to reduce 
the likelihood of conversion, evidence is mixed.16  Cyree et al. (2005) find that banks that 
convert to Subchapter S have a higher level of available-for-sale securities, whereas 
Hodder et al. (2003) find the opposite result.  The differences in these findings are 
possibly attributed, in part, to differences in sample selection.  Hodder et al. (2003) in 
their logistic regressions use the average available-for-sale securities during the three 
years prior to election availability (1994-1996) to indicate the level of gains whereas 
Cyree et al. (2005) measure the level of securities in the year of election.    
3.1.5 Bank Holding Companies 
A restriction on electing Subchapter S status occurs when a banks is an affiliate of 
a Bank Holding Company.  In order for the bank to convert to Subchapter S status the 
entire Bank Holding Company must elect the tax status (U.S.C., §1361(b)(B)).  
Surprisingly, Harvey and Padget (2000) find in their sample of banks, 85 percent of 
Subchapter S banks are affiliated with BHCs while only 80 percent of Subchapter C 
banks are associated with BHCs.  Thus the additional requirement of combined election 
does not create a major obstacle to electing Subchapter S status. 
3.1.6 Tax Loss Carry Forwards 
C corporations can carry losses back two years and forward twenty y ars to offset 
corporate income taxes.  When banks convert to Subchapter S status they lose the option 
to carry forward these losses.  Any losses previously experienced and carried forward 
will be lost, thus reducing the banks regulatory capital (U.S.C., §1371(b)(1)).  This 
reduction of capital can have negative implications for banks.  For instance, when 
                                                
16 Both articles used capital gains over assets on available-for-sale securities to represent the firm’s built-in 
gains. 
 27
regulatory capital levels fall below minimum standards regulators may intervene 
increasing costs for the banks.  Additional costs also arise due to th  risk-adjusted deposit 
insurance premiums imposed by the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation because these 
fees are based upon the bank’s capital levels (FDICIA, 1991). 
When a bank converts to Subchapter S status the bank’s earnings and losses are 
passed through to the individual shareholders.  Shareholders must pay taxes on these 
earnings, but they can use the losses from the bank to offset their ordinary income.  This 
becomes an attractive option when the individual income tax rate is higher than the 
corporate tax rate.  Conversely, if the bank expects to have profits, Subchapter S status is 
most beneficial when the individual tax rate is set below that of the corporate rate.   
Since tax loss carry forwards are lost upon Subchapter S conversion, banks that 
currently have these losses are predicted to be less likely to convert.  Cyree et al. (2005) 
find that banks with loss carry forwards are more likely to elect Subchapter S status.  This 
finding is in contrast to theory and the findings of Hodder et al. (2003) and Gilbert and 
Wheelock (2007).   
3.2 Reorganization Prior to Conversion 
Theory suggests an organization will elect Subchapter S status when tax savings 
exceed conversion costs (Scholes and Wolfson, 1992).  Thus all banks are not equally 
good candidates for conversion because some of the provisions make it too xpensive for 
banks to convert to Subchapter S status.  These provisions may force a bank’s conversion 
costs to exceed the benefits of the tax advantage.  Thus many banks seek ways to reduce 
these conversion costs prior to electing Subchapter S status.  Hodder et al. (2003) find 
banks who decide to elect Subchapter S status typically begin a reorganization process 
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prior to conversion.  These actions included reducing the number of shareholdes, 
eliminating preferred stock, reducing dividend payments, selling securiti s, and 
maximizing the use of tax loss carry forwards.  These actions are taken in years prior to 
conversion to reduce the costs of converting while increasing or emphasizing the 
benefits.   
3.2.1 Bank Size/ Shareholders 
The provisions of Subchapter S status restrict the number of shareholders to 100 
and only allow for one class of stock (U.S.C., §1361(b)(1)).  To qualify for this tax status, 
banks begin to reorganize their equity by reducing the number of stockholders prior to 
converting to reduce their costs (Hodder et al., 2003).  Harvey and Padget (2000) argue 
one of the largest obstacles associated with converting to Subchapter S is restructuring 
ownership and convincing shareholders of the benefits of conversion because all 
shareholders must consent to the new ownership structure.   
The earnings of S corporations are passed through to the shareholders.  
Shareholders often are hesitant to elect this status because it typically will increase their 
taxable income at the personal level.  In addition, Subchapter S shareholde s are treated 
as limited partners for tax purposes which complicate their personal tax filings.   
3.2.2 Dividends and Taxes 
To increase the benefits of converting to Subchapter S status, banks will try to 
reduce costs if possible.  Hodder et al. (2003) find that banks electing Subchapter S status 
after 1997, tried to increase benefits from electing this status by eliminating preferred 
dividends and international investors prior to converting.  They also find ba ks begin to 
reduce the amount of dividend payments (Hodder et al., 2003).  These banks decrease 
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their dividends to reduce the amount of funds subject to double taxation prior to election 
with the expectation of increasing them in the future when they ar only subject to the 
individual tax rate. Thus, Hodder et al. (2003) find banks more likely to convert to 
Subchapter S status when conversion allows the bank to reduce their dividend taxes. 
3.2.3 Unrealized Gains 
Any unrealized gains that a bank has at conversion are subject to double taxation.  
Based upon these penalties, banks may seek to avoid these costly penalties prior to 
electing by recognizing gains prior to conversion.  Hodder et al. (2003) find banks begin 
to sell securities to recognize gains and reduce the penalty tax on realized gains prior to 
their conversion.   
3.2.4 Tax Loss Carry Forwards 
Banks that convert to Subchapter S status are unable to take advantage of net 
operating loss carry forwards under the current legislation.  In addition, after conversion 
these banks incur a tax on any unrealized gains that exist.  Banks will try to avoid losing 
this benefit.  As indicated by Hodder et al. (2003) building of net operating loss carry 
forwards decline in the years prior to conversion.  Banks may delay electing Subchapter 
S status until they have used up, or partially used up, their carry fo wards.  
Simultaneously, recognizing gains and using up loss carry forwards, reduces the costs of 
converting.   Cyree et al. (2005) find the opposite of the expected acion for loss carry 
forwards.  Banks with losses in the past three years are more likely to convert to 
Subchapter S status.  This goes against the expectation and suggests oth r factors 
dominate the decisions to convert. 
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3.3 Changes in Banks Characteristics After Subchapter S Election 
After electing Subchapter S status banks may change some of their operating 
characteristics.  Subchapter S banks will typically increase their dividend payment 
structure (Cyree et al., 2005; Harvey and Padget, 2000; Hodder et al., 2003; and Gilbert 
and Wheelock, 2007).  Management will increase the amount of dividend payments at 
least to the point where the shareholders are as well off as if the bank does not convert to 
Subchapter S status.  The shareholders are now taxed on a pro rata basis on the banks 
earnings, whether or not they are paid out directly to the shareholders in dividends. This 
suggests banks must pay dividends to shareholders for their increased tax payments and 
their forfeiture of time preference.  As individual income tax rates increase so should the 
dividend payout (Refer to Table 1).  
Harvey and Padget (2000) find that due to the increase in dividend payments, 
Subchapter S banks show a reduction in their capital levels relative to Subchapter C 
banks, although the capital levels still remain at acceptable levels.  They also find that 
banks that converted to Subchapter S status subsequently have a decrease in p r onnel 
expenses, possibly indicating that these banks previously were utilizing salary expenses 
as an avenue for extracting money from the banks to avoid the double taxation.  
Because the potential after tax returns for the shareholder at the individual level 
are greater, banks may be encouraged to take on a higher level of loans and thus a higher 
level of risk. Harvey and Padget (2000) find that both Subchapter S and Subchapter C 
banks showed little change in their level of non-performing loans after conversion.  
However, they find that Subchapter S banks have higher profits three years prior to 
converting to Subchapter S status.  This could indicate a higher degree of risk in the 
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banks’ portfolios but bank examination ratings for both Subchapter S and Subchapter C 
banks showed good overall conditions with no significant increase in 
shareholders/owners risk (Harvey and Padget, 2000). 
One adjustment noted in the Subchapter S banks’ portfolios is a reduction in he 
amount of non taxable state and municipal securities (Harvey and Padget, 2000).  This is 
somewhat surprising because once the banks converts to Subchapter S sta us, they are no 
longer subject to the AMT.  Under Subchapter C status, banks often don’t get the full 
benefit from the municipal securities due to the AMT.  By avoiding the AMT, Subchapter 
S banks are able to keep more of the benefit from the tax advantage provided by 
municipal securities.   
3.4 Limitations of Previous Empirical Analyses 
Previous research on the characteristics of banks most likely to convert to 
Subchapter S status is limited because it is not possible to know the number of 
shareholders in the banks since these banks tend to be privately held.  This limitation ay 
confuse the results from investigations of banks which are most likely to convert because 
the shareholder restriction is typically one of the largest obstacles to conversi .   
Empirical analysis may be misleading if comparison groups of banks re not 
similar to the Subchapter S banks being analyzed.  Cyree et al. (2005) do not match 
Subchapter S banks with Subchapter C banks directly on size.  Instead, the Subchapter C 
banks they compared to their Subchapter S bank sample are all Subchapter C banks with 
total assets less than the total assets of the largest Subchapter S bank, thus inherently 
leaving in a size bias.  In addition, identification markers for Subchapter S status are not 
included in the 1997 and 1998 Call Reports at the time of their study.  They base their 
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identifications of Subchapter S banks upon positive profits and no taxes, which precludes 
direct identification of all Subchapter S banks.  In their study they are only able to 
identify 165 out of the 596 1997 Subchapter S banks and 360 out of 1035 of the 1998 
Subchapter S banks.  Because they are not able to accurately identify all of the 
Subchapter S banks, some Subchapter S banks are probably included in the matched 
sample of Subchapter C banks.   However, Cyree et al. (2005) improve on the work of 
Hodder et al. (2003) by looking at differences between rural and urban banks and de novo 
and established banks.  
Gilbert and Wheelock (2007) also have limitations in their analysis.  When 
comparing characteristics of the two groups of banks they only consider averages for 
Subchapter S bank and Subchapter C banks.  They also did not account for differences in 
state income taxes when comparing performance measures.   
 Previous investigations were conducted when the number of allowable 
shareholders was 75 and there were further restrictions on the definition of eligible 
shareholders (Harvey and Padget, 2000; Hodder et al. 2003; and Cyree et al., 2005).  
Since the time of these earlier investigations, the number of shareholders permitted has 
increased to 100 and some of the limitations on who qualifies as shareholders have 
broadened (U.S.C., §1361(b)(1)(A)).  As the restrictions on Subchapter S status have 
changed, so will the banks that are eligible for election.  Due to these changes, it is 







SMALL BUSINESS LENDING AND SMALL BANKS 
 
Deregulation legislation passed since 1980 has significantly impacted the U.S. 
banking industry.  Both state and federal legislation removed barriers to expansion for 
large banks.  The number of banks operating in the U.S. has declined by approximately 
50 percent partially as a result of deregulation.   The number of commercial banks 
operating in the United States has decreased from 14,434 in 1980 to 7,283 as of 
December 31, 2007 (FDIC, 2008).  As consolidation within financial institutions 
continues, the viability and role of the small bank is being questioned.  Small banks 
continue to lose market share as other financial institutions encroach into their market 
place (Craig and Harder, 2007).   
Small banks play a pivotal role in the U.S. financial system by relying on personal 
contact, community ties, and close relationships with their borrowers.  These institutions 
typically are pivotal in meeting the needs of small businesses, includ g farms (Akhavein 
et al., 2004).  Expansion by larger financial institutions can be detrimental for small 
community banks and their customers (Craig and Harder, 2007; Berger et al., 1998). 
4.1 Progression of Deregulation in the Banking Industry 
The Depository Institutions Deregulation and Monetary Control Act of 1980 was 
one of the first pieces of deregulation legislation to affect the financial services industry
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since the Great Depression.  The act phased out Regulation Q by removing the ceilings 
on deposit interest rates, allowing banks to more effectively compete with other financial 
institutions (DIDMCA, 1980).  Regulation Q was initiated as part of the Glass-Steagall 
Act of 1933 when the government imposed limits on the interest rates that banks could 
pay, including a rate of zero on demand deposits. With the ceiling on rates imposed, this 
opened the door for competition and led to the growth of money market funds as a 
substitute for banks traditional deposit accounts (Rose and Hudgins, 2008). 
The McFaddan Act of 1927 restricted banks’ branching ability and provided 
states with the authority to control their branching activity.  The McFadden Act 
prohibited interstate branching by allowing national banks to branch o ly within the state 
in which they are located (McFaddan Act, 1927).  To increase market share and stimulate 
demand, states slowly began to allow branching activities within ther state.  Intrastate 
branching primarily occurred through mergers and acquisitions.  By 1991 a majority of 
states allowed some type of branching.  All states except Arkansas, Iowa, and Minnesota 
allowed intrastate branching and all states except Hawaii, Kansas, and Montana allowed 
some type of interstate banking.  In 1994, branching activity increased with the passing of 
the Reigle-Neal Interstate Banking and Branching Efficiency A t.  This law took some of 
the state power away and provided the federal government with regulatory power to 
authorized interstate banking and branching across lines (RNIBBEA, 1994).  Only 
Montana and Texas opted out of interstate branching.   However, banks are still acquired 
across state lines through the creation of bank holding companies.  Bank holding 
companies allow a bank to acquire another bank and then convert it into a branch, which 
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encouraged a much more rapid consolidation of the banking industry (Rose and Hudgins, 
2008). 
The Gramm-Leach-Bliley (GLB) Act of 1999 repealed much of the Glass-
Steagall Act of 1933, which forced a separation between commercial banking and 
investment banking, and the Bank Holding Company Act of 1956, which regulates the 
functions of holding companies.  GLB created financial holding companies d permitted 
consolidation of insurance companies, commercial banks, and investment banks.  
Financial holding companies are allowed to engage in a variety of financial activities 
including: insurance, securities underwriting and agency activities, m rchant banking, 
and insurance company portfolio investment activities (GLB, 1999). GLB ultimately 
created financial conglomerates that provide a wide array of financial services without 
geographic restrictions (Rose and Hudgins, 2008). 
4.2 The Role of Community Banks 
Deregulation of the banking industry has caused an increase in competition and a 
decline in the number of banks (DeYoung et al., 2004).   Because of deregulation, the US 
banking industry is becoming polarized with two major classifications: large complex 
banks at one extreme and small community banks at the other (Berger et al., 1995).  As 
the consolidation of the banking industry continues, the survival of the community bank 
comes into question.  The questionable viability of small banks also may threaten the 
viability of the small businesses they serve.   
DeYoung et al. (2004) provide this description of a community bank, “A 
community bank is a financial institution that accepts deposits from and provides 
transaction services to local households and businesses, extends credit to local 
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households and businesses, and uses the information it gleans in the course of providing 
these services as a comparative advantage over larger institutions.  A community bank 
holds a commercial bank or thrift charter; operates physical offices only within a limited 
geographic area; offers a variety of loans and checkable insured deposit accounts; and has 
a local focus that precludes its equity shares from trading in well-developed capital 
markets.”   
Something that is missing from this definition is the importance of small 
businesses to these small banks.  Small banks tend to focus on small business lending 
because legal lending limits restricts the size of permissible loans.  Large banks also 
provide small business loans, but the literature documents that large b nks allocate fewer 
resources to small business loans (Berger et al., 1995).   
Mergers and acquisitions have decreased the number of small banks.  It i  
predicted that small business loan activity is affected by this decreasing number in small 
banks (Strahan and Weston, 1996; Berger et al., 1998).  Evidence provided from The 
Survey of Small Business Finances suggests that as banks get larger, small businesses 
have overall less access to capital (Craig and Hardee, 2007).  In 1999 small business 
lending accounted for 25.5 percent of all bank lending for community banks but only 
accounted for 7.85 of the total lending for banks over $5 billion in assets (Ely and 
Robinson, 2001). 
4.3 The Role of Small Businesses in the U.S. Economy 
The Small Business Act (1953) identifies a small business as "one that is 
independently owned and operated and which is not dominant in its field of operati n."   
The size of the organization based upon number of employees varies from one industry to 
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another, as defined by academics and the Small Business Administrat ons’ Office of 
Advocacy.  For research purposes, 500 employees is the typical upperbound in 
identifying a small business (Office of the Advocacy, 2009).  According to the U.S. 
Small Business Administration (SBA, 2006) small businesses repres nt 99.7 percent of 
all employer firms and account for half of all private sector employment.  The U.S. 
Bureau of Census reports that small businesses have generated 60 to 80 percent annually 
of all new jobs over the past ten years, doubling that created by large firms during the 
same period (U.S. Census, 2008).  In addition, small businesses are leading innovators in 
the economy producing 13 to 14 times more patents than large firms (CHI Research, 
2003).  Over 45 percent of the total U.S. private payroll goes to small business 
employees.  These businesses produced 97 percent of all identified exports and 28.6 
percent of export value in fiscal year 2004 (SBA, 2008). 
4.4 Community Banks and Small Businesses 
Small businesses have a major impact on the U.S. economy and typically the 
largest suppliers of debt capital to these small businesses are sm ll r commercial banks.   
The relationship between small businesses and small banks has significant national 
economic implications due to the importance of small businesses to the economy.   
4.4.1 The Use of Relationship Lending by Small Banks 
 Primarily due to the restriction on the number of shareholders imposed under 
Subchapter S, Subchapter S banks are typically small banks.  These small banks are 
typically referred to as community banks by those within the banking industry and 
academia.17  Small banks have loan portfolios and risk tolerances that are different from 
                                                
17 Community banks are typically those with asset size less than $1 billion (CRA, 2005). 
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larger banks.  Small banks have an important role in the economy as they are an 
important provider of funds to small businesses and have loan portfolios with a stronger 
focus on small business lending (Nakamura 1994; Peterson and Rajan 2002).  Small 
banks tend to emphasize lending to small businesses in part due to their use of 
relationship lending (Berger, et al., 1995).  Federal Reserve Governor Mishkin in his 
testimony before the Committee on Small Business and Entrepreneurship, U.S. Senate, 
testified that the relationship between small banks and small businesses is crucial to small 
businesses during the subprime mortgage crisis and the tightening of credit policies by 
various lending institutions (Mishkin, 2008). 
4.4.1.1. Relationship Versus Transaction-Based Lending 
Banks focus on the extremes of either relationship lending or transactional 
lending since the deregulation of the banking industry in the 1980s (DeYoung et al., 
2004).  Due to the regulatory changes in lending and innovations in technology, large 
banks are becoming complex organizations which focus more on hard financial 
information gathered and analyzed using computerized statistical models and centralized 
decision making.  Conversely, small banks tend to focus on relationship lending through 
the gathering of soft information obtained through personal knowledge acquired over 
time.  Additional information is ascertained through an evaluation and understanding of 
the customers’ business conditions and community (Akhavein, 2004; Berger and Udell, 
2002; Berger and Udell, 1995). 
Large banks often have diseconomies of scale and thus are less likely to lend to 
small business which are typically only able to provide “soft” information (Berger et al. 
2001).  Berger, et al. (2005) use the Herfindahl index to evaluate market saturation and 
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match small businesses with the bank from which they borrow.  They find small banks 
are better able to use and collect soft information, and therefore t nd to focus on lending 
activities that are best suited for their organizational structu e. Furthermore, they 
conclude that the lending relationships developed by small banks are typically more long-
lived and more comprehensive, which perhaps is due to incentives given to loan officers.   
4.4.1.2 Gaining Private Information Through Relationships   
The use of soft information and relationship lending tends to make small banks 
more efficient at providing small business loans.  The importance of relationship lending 
to small business is affected very little by regulatory and technological advances 
(DeYoung et al., 2004).  Berger et al. (2005) find that the process of lending to small 
businesses has changed very little over the last three decades.18 Loan officers still 
recognize the importance of gathering soft information and the personal cont ct required 
to gather this private information. 
Under relationship lending, information is gathered by the lenders which expands 
beyond the public data available from financial statements, observation of collateral, and 
other public sources.  This private information is acquired over time by the lender 
through the duration and scope of the banking relationship (Berger and Udell, 1995; Boot 
and Thakor, 1994).  Small banks are able to obtain private information when they have a 
stronger relationship with a small business.  This relationship is further strengthened 
when the small business utilizes additional services from the lending institution (Degryse 
and Cayseele, 2000).  Small banks are able to monitor changes in the small business’s 
deposits and thus make better loan judgments.   
                                                
18 They analyzed loans ranging from $250,000 to $15,000,000.  This loan size was meant to represent loans 
provided by community banks, those with asset size less than $1,000,000,000. 
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Small businesses are often more informationally opaque than large businesses, 
primarily because they often do not have certified financial statements nor do they have 
publicly traded debt or equity securities.  Small banks are better suited for providing 
these loans (Berger and Frame, 2007). Large banks base decisions more on financial data 
than prior relationships (Cole et al., 2004).  The relationship that large banks have with 
small businesses tend to be less exclusive, less personal, shorter in duration, and extend 
over a longer geographic distance (Berger et al., 2005).  Carter, McNulty, and Verbrugge 
(2004) find that risk-adjusted yields are higher for small banks.  This suggests the better 
use of information by small banks.  Smaller banks can also have an advant ge in 
providing loans to small businesses versus larger business as shownby their ability at 
charging higher interest rates on loans and lower rates on deposits (Hannan, 1991).  
Although large banks provide loans to small business, they tend to focus on the larger end 
of the small business category and still rely on hard information (Strahan and Weston, 
1998).  
4.4.1.3 Relationship Lending and Decentralized Decision Making  
One of the explanations for small banks’ competitive advantage is small banks are 
more efficient processors of soft information which is attributed to fewer managerial 
levels (DeYoung et al., 2004; Nakamura 1993, 1994; Peterson and Rajan, 1994; and 
Mester, Nakamura, and Renault, 1998).  Berger and Udell (2002) find these small banks 
are more likely to grant decision making power to managers.  Thus the managers are 
better equipped to extract private information through a strong relationship and make 
more informed lending decisions.  This allows the bank the opportunity to establish a 
long-term, personal relationship and gather private information from small businesses 
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(Brickley, Linck, and Smith, 2003; Nakamura, 1993, 1994).  Thus relationship lending is 
profitable for small banks.  Evidence shows small community banks will continue to 
utilize relationship lending since economic shocks have little impact on these banks 
(Yeager, 2004) 
Large banks tend to choose the larger safer loans that are also easier to evaluate.  
Cole et al. (2004) conclude that larger banks tend to evaluate loans on the basis of 
financial statements and in general the hard information.  Small banks may have a 
lending advantage due to making better choices in evaluating their customer .  This 
advantage can come from small banks’ ability to more efficiently use soft information 
from their customers by monitoring their deposits (Hein, Koch, and MacDonald, 2005).  
4.4.1.4 The Ownership Structure’s Impact on Relationship Lending 
Studies find that small banks and their relationships with small businesses are not 
impacted by the banks ownership structure, e.g. affiliates of a bank holding company 
(Berger, Miller, Petersen, Rajan, and Stein, 2002).  This agrees with Stein (2002) who 
concludes that when the decision making, even in multitier structures is decentralized to 
the bank/manager level, neither the size of the institution nor its association with a bank 
holding company matters.  Although, Keeton (1995) finds that small banks affiliated with 
bank holding companies are often like large banks. 
4.5 Implications for Agricultural Lending and Small Banks 
As the number of community banks continues to decline, the impact of failures, 
mergers, and acquisitions on these institutions brings into question the viability of the 
agriculture industry.  Previous literature analyzes the strong relationship between 
community banks and small businesses, including the agriculture sector (Akhavein et al., 
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2004).  The question that arises is: if community banking continues to declines what will 
happen to these areas? 
Farming is less important to the national economy than in previous years, but 
many state and local economies still rely heavily on the agriculture industry.  The 
agriculture industry has shrunk from 2,439,510 U.S. farms in 1980 to approximately 
2,200,000 in 2008 (USDA, 2009).  Agricultural lending is crucial to the survival of small 
farms and commercial banks are a large source of credit extended to farmers.  In 2008 
commercial banks held 38 percent of farm business debt, approximately 33 percent of 
farm real estate loans, and approximately 56 percent of operating loans (USDA, 2009). 
The impact of consolidation on agriculture lending is mixed.  Some studie  find 
the declining number of commercial banks has led to a decline in small business lending 
including agricultural lending (Berger et al., 1998, Berger et al., 2004), while other 
studies find consolidation to have no effect on lending activities to these s ctors (Strahan 
and Weston, 1998; Featherstone, 1996).  Keeton (1996) analyzes mergers of banks 
occurring in the 10th Federal Reserve district and discovers that once a bank is acquired 
by a larger institution, they reduce their lending to small local farms.  This supports the 
finding of an inverse relationship between the size of the organization nd the percent of 
farm loans to total loans (Gilbert and Belongia, 1988).  Others show that the decrease in 
small bank lending to the agriculture industry is partially offset by the entrance of new 
banks into the market place (Akhavein et al., 2004).    
Often farms are older with well established relationships with their lending 
institutions.  Akhavein et al. (2004) discover older, more established farms receive more 
credit.  For each additional year of existence of the farm, they find an increase of 2.66 
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percent more agriculture lending.  This more favorable lending for m re established 
relationships is well documented (Petersen and Rajan, 1994; Berger and Udell, 1995; 
Harhoff and Korting, 1998).  Although the amount of lending increases as the 
relationship increases, the overall amount of lending coming from banks declines as the 
firm ages, especially for farms.  This is attributed in part to banks increasing in size and 
being able to provide more commercial loans.  For example, for each m rginal $10 
million in assets the bank reduces their ratio of agricultural loans to assets by 0.8 percent 
(Akhavein, 2004).   
 Because Subchapter S banks are often small, some studies evaluate how these 
conversions are disbursed among rural and urban communities.  In 2002, community 
banks accounted for 58 percent of all banking offices and 49 percent of all deposits in 
rural communities (Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City, 2003).   As expected, more 
rural banks are beginning to elect Subchapter S status each year.  In 1997, one percent of 
rural banks were Subchapter S banks compared to 45 percent by year end 2003.  In 
comparison to rural banks, less than 25 percent of urban banks converted to Subchapter S 
status by 2003, while 45 percent of rural banks converted (Cyree et al., 2005).  This is not 
surprising since rural banks are often smaller and these smallbanks operate in smaller 
markets and have fewer competitors (Gilbert, 1984) 
  Agricultural lending is more important for rural banks.  Commercial and 
industrial lending is often more important for urban banks.  Operating in limited 
geographical markets with highly concentrated loan portfolios may encourage managers 
to choose slower growth and higher capital ratios regardless of tax status.  In fa t growing 
markets, managers may choose to increase their risk tolerance in order to grow.  Banks in 
 44
fast growing markets tend to have less capital, increased operating risk, and are less likely 
to choose Subchapter S status.  Whereas rural banks are more likely to have the 
characteristics more suited to Subchapter S status (Akhavein, et al., 2004).   
Small banks which utilize relationship lending are vital to the success of their 
local communities, including small businesses and the agriculture industry.  These small 
businesses are in turn vital to the success of the U.S. economy.  There is concern over the 
reduction in the number of banks and their continued viability.  Subchapter S tax benefits 
may enable small banks to compete more efficiently with larger banks.  If small banks are 
able to remain a competitive force in the banking industry, this may increase their 





METHODOLOGY AND HYPOTHESES 
 
5.1 Research Question 
 The research question for this study is, what happens to the tax benefit provided 
to banks by conversion to Subchapter S status?  In the spirit of Subchapter S legislation 
and as argued by bankers and banking groups, these funds are supposedly passed on to 
their local communities through increased lending to small business and agriculture.  If 
this occurs, Subchapter S banks are expected to increase the proportion of small 
businesses loans and agricultural loans following conversion.  This analysis investigates 
if the tax savings are being passed on to the local community or, instead, if the banks use 
the funds for other purposes such as increasing capital through earnings etention, salary 
increases, or increased dividends.   
5.2 Methodology 
5.2.1 Modified Event Study 
This study utilizes a modified event study methodology with a unique matching 
procedure to evaluate the performance of banks that convert to Subchapter S tax status.  
The modified event study methodology is based upon the methodology proposed by 
Barber and Lyon (1996) which uses accounting data.  The reason this event study must
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rely on accounting data is because most small commercial banks are not traded in active 
national securities markets.  As a result, market prices are not available.   
This investigation evaluates the impact of bank conversion by examining 
abnormal changes in bank performance.  To calculate abnormal performance around the 
conversion event, an estimation of what performance would be in the absence of the 
event is calculated.  Therefore, the abnormal performance represents unexpected changes 
associated with the conversion.  To capture unexpected changes, performance is used 
from 3 years before the event to help represent expected performance.  
As suggested in Barber and Lyon (1996), changes in characteristi s of banks will 
provide stronger information than just evaluating levels.  Evaluating changes allows the 
inclusion of the history of the firm relative to the industry benchmark.  The methodology 
of this analysis follows the reasoning and employs changes in performance. 
Each bank experiencing a conversion event is matched with a group of control 
banks based on the matching procedure described later in this chapter.  Conclusions are 
based on changes in the sample Subchapter S banks’ characteristics r lative to changes in 
the median value of the control Subchapter C banks characteristics.  Thi  framework 
indicates the expected post performance is equivalent to its past performance plus a 
change in the benchmark performance.  As suggested in Barber and Lyon and expanded 
in Lie (2001), the expected change is based on the change in the control group.  The 
control group in this study represents banks that remain in Subchapter C tax status 
through the entire study period.  The expected performance of those banks that are in the 
group that convert to Subchapter S status, if we assume no conversion effect is: 
( ) 3,,3,., ( −+−+ −+= tintitinti CPERFCPERFPERFPERFE ) 
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where E(PERFi,t+n) represents the expected performance of Subchapter S bank i in year 
t+n, t represents the event year, and n represents the abnormal performance sub-windows 
-2 through +3.  PERFi,t-3 represents the baseline performance of Subchapter S bank i three 
years pre event, (CPERFi,t+n – CPERFi,t-3) equals the change in matched control bank i 
from three years before the event. 
Any deviations from the expected level indicate abnormal performance. This 
treatment tests if the change is caused by the conversion or other factors.  The abnormal 
performance (AP) variable for Subchapter S bank i i  period n is defined as actual minus 
expected performance: 
APi,n = PERFi,t+n – E(PERFi,t+n) 
The abnormal performance is calculated by taking the difference between the actual 
performance of Subchapter S bank i and the expected performance.  The expected 
performance indicates what should have occurred to bank i in the absence of the event.  
The expectation is calculated with the median matched Subchapter C control banks.  The 
abnormal performance (AP) equation can be rewritten n relation to Subchapter S banks 
and banks that do not convert, Subchapter C banks.   
To calculate abnormal performance both an estimation and event period are 
defined.  The estimation period is defined to determine a portion of the expected 
performance.  For this study, the estimation period utilized is three years pre event.  The 
impact that the event has on the performance post estimation period is the event period.  
The entire event window is defined as (-3,+3), three y ars pre event to three years post 
event.  The event window is further divided into sub-windows to evaluate abnormal 
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performance at different intervals through the event wi dow.  Abnormal performance is 
evaluated at the following sub-windows (-3,-2), (-3,-1), (-3,0),(-3,1),(-3,2), and (-3,3).   
The event windows include pre event years in order to avoid transactional changes from 
banks preparing for the event.  These pre-announcement sub-windows are utilized to 
detect restructuring by banks in anticipation of the conversion event.  The event year is 
denoted as 0 and represents the approximate time of conversion.  The event year 
represents the financial information at the end of the year that the election to Subchapter 
S occurred.  Since we can not determine exactly when in the year the bank made the 
conversion choice, changes in the performance variables may be expected around the 
event date.   
In addition to calculating abnormal performance, cumulative abnormal 
performance is calculated.  Cumulative abnormal performance represents the 
accumulation of the abnormal performance over the six vent windows.   
CAPi,n = nini APCAP ,1, +−  
where AP\i,n is abnormal performance from years -3 through +3.  The null hypotheses 
evaluate if abnormal performance and cumulative average abnormal performance is equal 
to zero by using the Wilcoxon Sign-Ranked tests, which have been shown to be 
uniformly more powerful in event studies using accounting data (Barber and Lyon, 
1996). 
5.2.2 Matching Procedure 
Both the sample Subchapter S banks and the control Subchapter C banks were 
based on data in years t-3 through t+3.  A bank which elects Subchapter S status at any 
time during the sample period is ineligible for consideration as a control Subchapter C 
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bank because these banks start reorganizing components of their operations several years 
prior to the actual conversion (Gilbert and Wheelock, 2007; Cyree et al., 2005; Hodder, et 
al., 2003; Harvey and Padget, 2000).   
When evaluating the sample of Subchapter S banks, it i  important to have a 
control group of banks that is as similar as possible except for the conversion.  Barber 
and Lyon (1996) suggest the industry comparison group is held constant over time to 
place the same data requirements on sample and control firms.  For this study, the control 
group is constant for all tests.  
For each year in the study each bank that converts to Subchapter S status is 
matched with a group of non-converting Subchapter C banks using five matching criteria.  
The matching is done on data three years prior to the event to avoid capturing any 
discretionary changes made by the bank prior to the event date.  Hodder et al. (2003) 
evaluate variables three years pre event to avoid any tr nsitional changes, since they find 
that banks began to reduce dividends payout ratios pr r to the event as a way to increase 
tax benefits.  Barber and Lyon (1996) show test statistics are well specified only when the 
sample firms are matched to control firms of similar pre event performance or size and 
industry.  Alderson and Betker (2006) extend Barber and Lyon’s (1996) analysis and test 
matching on pre event levels versus matching on pre event changes.  They find matching 
on pre event changes yields more powerful test statistics than matching on levels.  Since 
banks that elect Subchapter S status have different pre-election financial performance 
prior to conversion than Subchapter C banks, matching on ROE or ROA is not ideal in 
this study.  Hodder, et al. (2003), Cyree et al. (2005), and Harvey and Padget (2000) find 
financial performance as one of the main qualities hat induces banks to convert to 
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Subchapter S.  Furthermore, Gilbert and Wheelock (2007) caution investigators about 
using financial performance measures when evaluating Subchapter S banks.  
Consequently, it is not ideal to use ROE or ROA as a matching criterion in this study.  
This is of no great consequence, since Barber and Lyon (1996) also find that for event 
studies, firms matched on size and industry yield tst statistics that are well specified for 
small firms.   
For this study, additional matching criteria are included with size to provide 
stronger matches.  The criteria are based upon theoretical considerations presented in 
previous literature on Subchapter S banks and review d in Chapter IV.  The matching 
process is:  
1. If a Subchapter C bank converts to Subchapter S at anytime during the 
sample period it is dropped from the possible matches. 
2. Both the Subchapter S bank and the Subchapter C banks are required to 
be in operation for at least six years prior to the conversion.  De novo 
banks behave differently and it takes several years before they have 
operating characteristics similar to that of established banks (Cryee and 
Wansley, 2004; DeYoung and Hasan, 1998; Brislin andSantomero, 
1991; Hunter and Srinivasan, 1990; and Huyser, 1986). 
3. The matched group of Subchapter C banks are from the same state as 
the bank that elects Subchapter S status.   Since som tates impose a 
state level corporate tax rate on earnings, not all banks receive equal 
benefits from electing Subchapter S status (Hodder, et al., 2003; Cyree, 
et al. 2005). 
 51
4. The matched control Subchapter C banks have the sam charter and 
match the Subchapter S bank’s location as rural or urban.19  Banks in 
MSAs behave differently and have different characteristics compared 
to rural banks (Cyree et al., 2005).  By imposing this restriction, 
differences in location are controlled. 
5. Once banks meet all of the previous requirements, the final criterion is 
the group of control banks chosen must have asset siz  within 10 
percent of its matched Subchapter S bank.    
To confirm the validity of the match, parametric paired t-test comparisons and 
non-parametric Wilcoxon Sign-Ranked tests are conducte .  The match is examined to 
evaluate if there are significant differences in the characteristics of the banks which 
experienced an event and the control group’s median value.  Any differences will be 
controlled through the use of the abnormal performance equation.   
Previous literature recognizes that banks begin to reorganize prior to election of 
the status (Hodder et al., 2003).  Thus using a three year pre event matching process, 
unmanaged, non-transitional variables are obtained.  This matching technique provides 
each Subchapter S bank with a group of matched Subchapter C banks.  In traditional 
market data based event studies, a market model is uti ized to control for market effects.  
In this study using accounting data, matched Subchapter C banks serve as the control 
mechanisms to separate out event effects from systemic ffects.   The median values of 
the matched Subchapter C banks will be utilized in the statistical testing.    
 
                                                
19 The matching criteria was if the S Bank was urban (in a MSA ) then the matched C Bank must also be in 
a MSA.   
 52
5.3 Data 
The sample for this research consists of 1,658 commercial banks which filed a 
Report of Condition and Income from June 1994 through June 2008.    Reports of 
Condition and Income, call reports, are available for all banks regulated by the Federal 
Reserve System, Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, and the Comptroller of the 
Currency. All data is on an individual bank basis.20  The data is downloadable from the 
Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago. This sample is comprised of banks that elect 
Subchapter S status between the years 1997-2004 and a matched sample of taxable 
Subchapter C banks.  Only commercial banks are included in this study and all other 
types of financial institutions are excluded from the sample.  Since this study utilizes 
three years pre event data for matching and control purposes, data starting in 1994 is 
needed to calculate the pre event variables in the empirical testing.   
Every bank is required to file a consolidated call report each quarter.  However, 
some schedules are not required to be filed every quarter.  For all banks, Schedule RC-C, 
part II, Loans to Small Businesses and Small Farms, is to be filed only as of the June 30 
report date.  Therefore, the consolidated call reports are used for the majority of the 
variables, but small business and small farm lending data are not available in the 
December reports.  To obtain these variables, data from the June reports are averaged.  
Thus for the 1997 sample of banks, December 1997, June 1997, and June 1998 data is 
utilized. 
Banks that convert to Subchapter S status are identified by a binary variable in the 
Report of Income.  This is a one-digit code which indicates whether the bank is, for 
                                                
20Schedules RC and RC-A through RC-T constitute the Report of Condition and its supporting schedules.  
Schedules RI, RI-A, RI-B, RI-D, and RI-E constitute th  Report of Income and its supporting schedules. 
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federal income tax purposes, either a  Subchapter S corporation or a qualifying 
Subchapter S subsidiary (U.S.C., §1361).   
 Lists of the variables for the matching process sequence as well as those for the 
hypotheses are available in Table 4 and Table 5.  These tables provide the FDIC variable 




















Table 4:  Variables Used in Hypotheses Testing 
   
Variable Definition FDIC Variable ID 
SB1 Small Business Loan with original amount of $100,0 0 
or less 
RCON5571 
   
SB2 Small Business Loan with original amount of more than 
$100,000 through $250,000 
RCON5573 
   
SB3 Small Business Loan with original amount of more than 
$250,000 through $1,000,000 
RCON5575 
   
AG1 Loans to finance agriculture production and other loans 
to farmers with original amount of $100,000 or less 
RCON5584 
   
AG2 Loans to finance agriculture production and other loans 
to farmers with original amount of more than $100,0 
through $250,000 
RCON5586 
   
AG3 Loans to finance agriculture production and other loans 
to farmers with original amount of more than $250,00  
through $1,000,000 
RCON5588 
   
FARM1 Loans secured with farmland with original amount of 
$100,000 or less 
RCON5579 
   
FARM2 Loans secured with farmland with original amount of 
more than $100,000 through $250,000 
RCON5581 
   
FARM3 Loans secured with farmland with original amount of 
more than $250,000 through $1,000,000 
RCON5583 
   
DIVIDENDS Cash dividends declared on common stock during the 
calendar year. 
RIAD4460 
   
SALARIES Salaries and benefits of all officers and employees of the 
bank and its consolidated subsidiaries. 
RIAD4135 
   
RET_EARN Retained Earnings less any net unrealized oss in the 
marketable equity securities portfolio and less the 



























Table 5:  Variables Used in Matching Process 
   
Variable Definition FDIC Variable ID 
SDUM A one-digit code indicating whether the 
bank is, for federal income tax purposes, 
is either an  "S corporation" or a 
"qualifying subchapter S subsidiary," as 
defined in Internal Revenue Code 
Section 1361, as of the report date 
RIADA530 
   
TA Total assets.  The sum of all asset items. RCFD2170 
   
CHARTER A code indicating the type of entity based 
on either the legal documents issued by 
the chartering or licensing authority or 
other documents of formation or the 
generally accepted name that summarizes 
the characteristics and business activities 
of the entity when a formal charter is not 
issued. 
RSSD9048 
   
STATE A two-character state abbreviation RSSD9200 
   
MSA A four-digit numeric code assigned to the 
Metropolitan Statistical Area (MSA) or 
Primary Metropolitan Statistical Area 
(PMSA) where the entity is physically 
located.  A city with a population of at 
least 50,000. 
RSSD9180 
   
 
5.3.1 Characteristics of Subchapter S and Subchapter C Banks  
Since commercial banks had access to Subchapter S status, the number of 
commercial banks choosing this status increased from 596 in 1997 to 2,345 as of 
December, 2007.  In total, 2,376 financial institutions have elected Subchapter S status; 
only 31 are not commercial banks.21  At the end of 2007, 4,876 (67.5 percent) 
commercial banks continued to operate as taxable Subchapter C banks (Table 6).  
Commercial banks with Subchapter S status in 1997 accounted for 6.54 percent of 
                                                
21 These 31 financial institutions include: 7 Nondeposit Trust Companies, 18 Savings Banks, and 6 
Industrial Banks (including thrift and loan instituons and Morris Plan Banks). 
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commercial banks in operation in the U.S. in 1997 and increased to 32.2 percent of the 
7,283 commercial banks at year end 2007.    
Table 6: Banks Leaving Subchapter S Status 
    
Year 
New Subchapter Total Subchapter 
Dropped 
Subchapter 
S Banks S Banks S Status 
1997 596 596 0 
1998 461 1,035 22 
1999 285 1,279 41 
2000 212 1,433 58 
2001 216 1,622 30 
2002 207 1,785 47 
2003 194 1,941 38 
2004 152 2,046 48 
2005 158 2,152 54 
2006 178 2,255 75 
2007 160 2,345 72 
 
 
Figure 1: Number of Subchapter S and Subchapter C Commercial Banks 


















































Banks that convert to Subchapter S status are smaller than their Subchapter C 
counterparts.  The mean total assets of all Subchapter C banks in 1997 was $572,836,000 
compared to a mean total asset value of $78,432,030 for banks Subchapter S banks 
(Table 7).  Since there are some very large Subchapter C banks, median values provide a 
better indicator of the differences between groups.  These values indicate that banks 
choosing Subchapter S status tend to be smaller than e Subchapter C banks in 
operation.   
Table 7: Comparison of Total Assets of Subchapter S Banks With  
All Subchapter C Banks 
       
 C Banks S Banks 
Year N Mean Median N Mean Median 
1997 8,548 $572,836,000 $72,735,500 596 $78,432,030 $48,359,000 
1998 7,742 $679,637,000 $80,423,000 1,035 $85,067,950 $52,690,000 
1999 7,303 $753,679,000 $85,272,000 1,279 $90,950,260 $57,104,500 
2000 6,882 $864,275,000 $90,354,000 1,433 $98,354,670 $59,981,000 
2001 6,460 $964,833,000 $99,731,000 1,622 $105,712,200 $63,526,000 
2002 6,103 $1,097,215,000 $109,100,000 1,785 $114,340,300 $67,891,000 
2003 5,829 $1,228,461,000 $118,239,000 1,941 $122,691,500 $73,044,000 
2004 5,585 $1,406,228,000 $126,651,000 2,046 $138,047,9 0 $77,116,000 
2005 5,374 $1,559,037,000 $137,644,500 2,152 $151,034,2 0 $84,384,000 
2006 5,146 $1,802,894,000 $147,058,000 2,255 $164,173,000 $88,886,000 
2007 4,938 $2,045,760,000 $152,436,000 2,345 $177,276,800 $96,769,000 
 
5.4 Hypotheses 
5.4.1 Hypothesis One: Small Business Lending 
The first hypothesis tests the extent to which banks are using the tax savings to 
increase lending to small businesses.   The hypothesis is tested by evaluating abnormal 
performance and cumulative abnormal performance.       
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 To more fully explore the hypothesis, I analyze three origination amounts of small 
business lending (Refer to Table 4).  The different origination amounts provide an 
analysis of small business loans with origination amounts less than $100,000 to large 
small business loans with origination amounts up to $1,000,000. 
Hypothesis 1: The abnormal performance in the proportion of small business lending by 
banks after conversion to Subchapter S is zero. 
APi,n = SBL_PERFi,t+n – E(SBL_PERFi,t+n)=0 
The change in proportional small business lending by banks that convert to Subchapter S 
bank status is compared to the median value of a group of control non-converting 
Subchapter C banks during the same time period.  Under the null hypothesis abnormal 
performance is predicted to be zero.  Abnormal performance is calculated for all sub-
event windows.  
 If the event does produce positive abnormal performance in banks, then this 
confirms what various banking organizations and representatives conjecture.  This would 
indicate that banks are utilizing the tax advantage to benefit small businesses through 
increased lending.  If the event induces negative abnormal performance in banks, this 
may suggest that banks may have changed their risk tolerance.  Small business loans tend 
to be more informationally opaque.  Berger et al. (2001) anticipate a reduction in these 
informationally opaque small business loans due to the difficulty in accessing and 
quantifying their risk level.  Murphy (1983) found economies of scale in the commercial 
loan market; small loans to small firms are relatively more costly loans for lenders.  
Another possible explanation for a decline in small business lending could be attributed 
to a diversion of funds from small business lending to an increase in dividend payout.  If 
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there is no difference post event, then the conclusion i  that banks are not changing their 
small business lending behavior after the conversion event.   
5.4.2 Hypothesis Two:  Agricultural Lending 
 
 Commercial banks are the most important suppliers of loans to the agriculture 
industry, especially to small farms (Akhavein et al., 2004).  Small community banks, 
especially those in rural areas, tend to place a stronger emphasis on agricultural related 
lending. This hypothesis explores the change in the agricultural-based lending behavior 
of banks post conversion.    
 There are two different types of agricultural lending analyzed. The first 
classification is loans to finance agriculture production and other loans to farmers.  This 
type of lending is separated into three origination categories (Refer to Table 4).   
 In addition to loans to finance agricultural production, banks make loans secured 
with farmland.   These loans are also divided into three categories on the basis of the 
origination amount (Refer to Table 4).    
Hypothesis 2: The abnormal performance in the proportion of agricultural lending by 
banks after conversion to Subchapter S is zero. 
APi,n = AGL_PERFi,t+n – E(AGL_PERFi,t+n)=0 
 Both types of agricultural related loans are evaluated to examine if the conversion 
event produces abnormal performance in these loans.   Abnormal performance indicates a 
change in the proportion of agricultural related loans induced by the event.  If positive 
abnormal performance is detected then this is evidence in support of claims by various 
banking groups that Subchapter S status benefits local c mmunities. If negative abnormal 
performance is found then this indicates a decline in l nding to the agriculture sector due 
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to conversion.  A possible explanation for a decline in agriculture lending could be due to 
the increasing risk found in the agriculture industry (Henderson and Akers, 2009).  
During the sample period, weak farm markets led to an increase in delinquencies in 
agricultural loans (Meyer, 1999).  Another explanation could be the funds from 
agricultural related lending are being used to supplement dividends. 
5.4.3 Hypothesis Three:  Dividends 
 The third hypothesis explores how conversion impacts the distribution of 
dividends to owners.  Banks that elect Subchapter S tax status are able to avoid the 
federal corporate income tax, but taxes are calculated s if earnings are passed-through to 
the shareholders.  Thus the shareholders are taxed not only on what is paid in dividends, 
but also the earnings that are not distributed.  This will probably increase the shareholders 
taxes.    
 The effect of the conversion event will depend on the individual income tax rate, 
the tax rate on dividends, and the corporate tax rate. To make the shareholders as well off 
in the current time period as before the conversion to Subchapter S, dividend payments 
must increase after conversion to an amount that allows owners to pay any additional 
taxes.  Therefore, some increase in dividends is expected.     
Hypothesis 3: The abnormal performance in dividends paid by banks post conversion to 
Subchapter S is zero, or negative. 
APi,n = DIV_PERFi,t+n – E(DIV_PERFi,t+n) ≤ 0 
Positive abnormal performance would confirm findings by Cyree et al. (2005), 
Gilbert and Wheelock (2007), Cyree et al. (2005), Hodder et al. (2003), and Harvey and 
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Padget (2000) that banks increase their dividend payments after conversion to Subchapter 
S status.   
5.4.4 Hypothesis Four:  Salaries Paid   
  
 The fourth hypothesis further explores how the tax s vings is being distributed.  
More precisely, are employees reaping the benefit of additional salary income after the 
event?  Abnormal performance is predicted to be negative, if salaries were previously 
used as a mechanism to provide funds to the managers/owners of the banks without 
exposing the funds to double taxation.  Now that the double taxation consequence on 
dividends is removed, salaries are not the only option to extract funds and avoid double 
taxation, as supported by a decrease in personnel exp nses found by Harvey and Padget 
(2000). Conversely, if the event is used to benefit management through higher wages, a 
positive abnormal performance is predicted.    If the event does not influence banks 
distribution of salaries there will be no abnormal performance. 
Hypothesis 4: The abnormal performance in salaries and benefits paid by banks after 
conversion to Subchapter S is zero. 
APi,n = SAL_PERFi,t+n – E(SAL_PERFi,t+n)=0 
6.4.5 Hypothesis Five:  Retained Earnings  
  
 This hypothesis evaluates if the bank keeps any tax savings as retained earnings.  
Negative abnormal performance in the proportion of retained earnings paid by banks after 
conversion indicates banks have reduced their retain d earnings.  This corresponds with 
Hypothesis Three and an increase in dividends.  Since the increase in dividends is greater 
then the tax benefit received, a decrease in retained earning is anticipated.  Harvey and 
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Padget (2000) found that after conversion, banks showed a significant reduction in their 
capital levels.   
Hypothesis 5: The abnormal performance in retained earning by banks post conversion 
to Subchapter S is positive. 
APi,n = RE_PERFi,t+n – E(RE_PERFi,t+n)>0 
5.4.6 Overview of Hypotheses 
 Previous research evaluated bank performance characteristics prior to conversion 
(Gilbert and Wheelock, 2007; Cyree et al., 2005; Hodder, et al., 2003; Harvey and 
Padget, 2000) and focus on “average” changes after conversion (Cyree et al., 2005; 
Harvey and Padget, 2000).  The present investigation explores a different question from 
previous analysis of Subchapter S banks.  This study employs an innovative event study 
approach to control for systemic changes and focuses on how Subchapter S banks 
performance changes relative to banks that do not convert.  The evaluation of the change 
in specific characteristics of these banks in an event study framework utilizing accounting 
data and a multi-dimensional matching technique results in a more comprehensive and 







6.1 Statistical Evaluation of Matching Process 
The matching process was performed for each year of the study following the 
guidelines provided in Chapter V.  The results of the matching process are presented in 
Table 8 through Table 15.  Tables 8 through 15 reveal no difference between the total 
assets of the banks converting to Subchapter S banks d the control banks three years 
before conversion.  All eight years consistently show the converting banks and the 
control banks were the same size three years before conversion.   Three years is used as 
the baseline for the testing of the hypotheses.  While t e banks that converted to 
Subchapter S status and the control banks were the sam  size before the conversion date, 
their performance as measured by the hypotheses variables was not the same. 
6.1.1 Results of Matching Process on Hypothesis Variables  
6.1.1.1 Small Business Lending 
 In all years and in all origination amounts the banks that eventually converted to 
Subchapter S allocated a higher proportion of their assets to small business lending 
(Refer to Tables 8 through 15).  This effect is signif cant at the 0.10 level for most of the 
origination amounts in almost all years.  In 1997, 1998, 1999, 2001, and 2003 the 
Subchapter S banks provided a significantly (0.10 level) higher proportion of small 
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business loans in all three origination amounts.  In 2000, 2002, and 2004 the Subchapter 
S banks provided a higher proportion of small busine s loans in general, but the amounts 
























































































































































































































Table 8:  Tests of  Matching Criteria: Banks Converting to Subchapter S in 1997 
In 1997, 596 banks elected Subchapter S status.  After the matching 438 Sub.S banks remained in the 
sample.  The match is made in 1994, 3 years pre-event year.  Median values of the control groups are used 
for all calculations.  The variable Mean represents the mean value of the sample of banks that convert to 
Subchapter S in 1997 and the control groups.  Median represents the median value of the two groups at 
time of the match. Mean Dif represents the difference in the mean values of Subchapter S bank and the 
control banks.  All variables are divided by Total Assets (except Total Assets).   
        
Variables  Mean Median Mean Dif t Value Pr > |t| Wilcoxon Pr > |S| 
Total Assets        
Sub. S Banks 52,848 39,973 71.40 0.53 0.5941 1737 0.5129 
Control Banks 52,777 40,222      
SB Loans 1        
Sub. S Banks 0.0190 0.0051 0.0085 6.17 <0.0001 7715.5 <0.0001 
Control Banks 0.0105 0.0000      
SB Loans 2        
Sub. S Banks 0.0106 0.0000 0.0046 5.18 <0.0001 6269.5 <0.0001 
Control Banks 0.0060 0.0000      
SB Loans 3        
Sub. S Banks 0.0115 0.0000 0.0045 4.31 <0.0001 4267.5 <0.0001 
Control Banks 0.0069 0.0000      
Farm Loans 1        
Sub. S Banks 0.0075 0.0000 0.0050 5.99 <0.0001 5563.5 <0.0001 
Control Banks 0.0026 0.0000      
Farm Loans 2        
Sub. S Banks 0.0063 0.0000 0.0038 5.26 <0.0001 4820.5 <0.0001 
Control Banks 0.0025 0.0000      
Farm Loans 3        
Sub. S Banks 0.0029 0.0000 0.0019 3.86 0.0001 2082 <0.0001 
Control Banks 0.0011 0.0000      
Ag Loans 1        
Sub. S Banks 0.0200 0.0000 0.0113 4.79 <0.0001 4126.5 <0.0001 
Control Banks 0.0088 0.0000      
Ag Loans 2        
Sub. S Banks 0.0092 0.0000 0.0046 3.71 0.0002 3040 <0.0001 
Control Banks 0.0046 0.0000      
Ag Loans 3        
Sub. S Banks 0.0051 0.0000 0.0021 2.29 0.0225 1439.5 0.0012 
Control Banks 0.0029 0.0000      
Common Dividends        
Sub. S Banks 0.0075 0.0061 0.0034 8.39 <0.0001 23077.5 <0.0001 
Control Banks 0.0040 0.0035      
Salaries        
Sub. S Banks 0.0165 0.0158 0.0000 -0.15 0.8821 -550.5 0.8358 
Control Banks 0.0165 0.0159      
Retained Earnings        
Sub. S Banks 0.0574 0.0484 0.0043 2.17 0.0308 2548.5 0.3369 




Table 9:  Tests of  Matching Criteria: Banks Converting to Subchapter S in 1998 
In 1998, 461 banks elected Subchapter S status.  After the matching 341 Sub.S banks remained in the 
sample.  The match is made in 1995, 3 years pre-event year.  Median values of the control groups are 
used for all calculations.  The variable Mean represents the mean value of the sample of banks that 
convert to Subchapter S in 1998 and the control groups.  Median represents the median value of the two 
groups at time of the match. Mean Dif represents the difference in the mean values of Subchapter S bank 
and the control banks.  All variables are divided by Total Assets (except Total Assets).   
                
Variables  Mean Median Mean Dif t Value Pr > |t| Wilcoxon Pr > |S| 
Total Assets        
Sub. S Banks 54,859 42,349 167.09 1.28 0.2023 2968.5 0.1033 
Control Banks 54,692 42,556      
SB Loans 1        
Sub. S Banks 0.0172 0.0000 0.0058 3.93 0.0001 3443.5 0.0004 
Control Banks 0.0114 0.0000      
SB Loans 2        
Sub. S Banks 0.0087 0.0000 0.0030 3.44 0.0007 2881.5 0.0012 
Control Banks 0.0058 0.0000      
SB Loans 3        
Sub. S Banks 0.0102 0.0000 0.0029 2.31 0.0212 1577 0.0344 
Control Banks 0.0073 0.0000      
Farm Loans 1        
Sub. S Banks 0.0071 0.0000 0.0041 4.98 <0.0001 3130 <0.0001 
Control Banks 0.0030 0.0000      
Farm Loans 2        
Sub. S Banks 0.0073 0.0000 0.0043 4.55 <0.0001 2541 0.0003 
Control Banks 0.0030 0.0000      
Farm Loans 3        
Sub. S Banks 0.0029 0.0000 0.0017 3.58 0.0004 1157 0.0049 
Control Banks 0.0012 0.0000      
Ag Loans 1        
Sub. S Banks 0.0199 0.0000 0.0117 4.97 <0.0001 2700 0.0002 
Control Banks 0.0082 0.0000      
Ag Loans 2        
Sub. S Banks 0.0092 0.0000 0.0055 4.48 <0.0001 2097 0.0003 
Control Banks 0.0037 0.0000      
Ag Loans 3        
Sub. S Banks 0.0045 0.0000 0.0022 2.41 0.0163 836 0.0280 
Control Banks 0.0023 0.0000      
Common Dividends        
Sub. S Banks 0.0062 0.0051 0.0018 3.86 0.0001 9624.5 <0.0001 
Control Banks 0.0044 0.0034      
Salaries        
Sub. S Banks 0.0166 0.0164 0.0005 1.82 0.07 3508.5 0.0549 
Control Banks 0.0161 0.0154      
Retained Earnings        
Sub. S Banks 0.0594 0.0504 0.0071 2.95 0.0034 3353.5 0.0656 




Table 10:    Tests of  Matching Criteria: Banks Converting to Subchapter S in 1999 
In 1999, 285 banks elected Subchapter S status.  After the matching 201 Sub.S banks remained in the 
sample.  The match is made in 1996, 3 years pre-event year.  Median values of the control groups are 
used for all calculations.  The variable Mean represents the mean value of the sample of banks that 
convert to Subchapter S in 1999 and the control groups.  Median represents the median value of the two 
groups at time of the match. Mean Dif represents the difference in the mean values of Subchapter S bank 
and the control banks.  All variables are divided by Total Assets (except Total Assets).   
                
Variables Mean Median Mean Dif t Value Pr > |t| Wilcoxon Pr > |S| 
Total Assets        
Sub. S Banks 64,916 51,285 329.34 1.12 0.2661 1242 0.1329 
Control Banks 64,586 50,574      
SB Loans 1        
Sub. S Banks 0.0174 0.0000 0.0041 1.86 0.0640 923.5 0.0598 
Control Banks 0.0133 0.0032      
SB Loans 2        
Sub. S Banks 0.0085 0.0000 0.0024 2.17 0.0315 1090 0.0127 
Control Banks 0.0061 0.0000      
SB Loans 3        
Sub. S Banks 0.0102 0.0000 0.0035 2.60 0.0099 852 0.0399 
Control Banks 0.0067 0.0000      
Farm Loans 1        
Sub. S Banks 0.0061 0.0000 0.0019 1.95 0.0526 581 0.1098 
Control Banks 0.0043 0.0000      
Farm Loans 2        
Sub. S Banks 0.0058 0.0000 0.0019 1.69 0.0916 434.5 0.172 
Control Banks 0.0038 0.0000      
Farm Loans 3        
Sub. S Banks 0.0043 0.0000 0.0025 2.12 0.0352 238.5 0.1918 
Control Banks 0.0018 0.0000      
Ag Loans 1        
Sub. S Banks 0.0145 0.0000 0.0053 2.23 0.0269 755 0.0345 
Control Banks 0.0092 0.0000      
Ag Loans 2        
Sub. S Banks 0.0082 0.0000 0.0029 1.72 0.0879 398 0.1724 
Control Banks 0.0053 0.0000      
Ag Loans 3        
Sub. S Banks 0.0044 0.0000 0.0020 1.80 0.0740 196 0.2644 
Control Banks 0.0025 0.0000      
Common Dividends        
Sub. S Banks 0.0059 0.0049 0.0015 3.38 0.0009 2194 0.0055 
Control Banks 0.0044 0.0037      
Salaries        
Sub. S Banks 0.0165 0.0158 0.0007 2.05 0.042 1349.5 0.1023 
Control Banks 0.0158 0.0150      
Retained Earnings        
Sub. S Banks 0.0571 0.0505 0.0020 0.75 0.4567 370.5 0.6548 




Table 11:   Tests of  Matching Criteria: Banks Converting to Subchapter S in 2000 
In 2000, 212 banks elected Subchapter S status.  After the matching 156 Sub.S banks remained in the 
sample.  The match is made in 1997, 3 years pre-event year.  Median values of the control groups are 
used for all calculations.  The variable Mean represents the mean value of the sample of banks that 
convert to Subchapter S in 2000 and the control groups.  Median represents the median value of the two 
groups at time of the match. Mean Dif represents the difference in the mean values of Subchapter S bank 
and the control banks.  All variables are divided by Total Assets (except Total Assets).   
                
Variables Mean Median Mean Dif t Value Pr > |t| Wilcoxon Pr > |S| 
Total Assets        
Sub. S Banks 56,558 44,381 -43.31 -0.21 0.8371 155 0.7849 
Control Banks 56,602 43,568      
SB Loans 1        
Sub. S Banks 0.0154 0.0000 0.0029 1.35 0.1801 369.5 0.1851 
Control Banks 0.0124 0.0000      
SB Loans 2        
Sub. S Banks 0.0090 0.0000 0.0022 1.30 0.1964 510 0.0579 
Control Banks 0.0068 0.0000      
SB Loans 3        
Sub. S Banks 0.0114 0.0000 0.0050 2.57 0.011 510 0.0197 
Control Banks 0.0064 0.0000      
Farm Loans 1        
Sub. S Banks 0.0072 0.0000 0.0037 2.74 0.007 406 0.0649 
Control Banks 0.0034 0.0000      
Farm Loans 2        
Sub. S Banks 0.0080 0.0000 0.0040 2.57 0.0113 387 0.0788 
Control Banks 0.0040 0.0000      
Farm Loans 3        
Sub. S Banks 0.0037 0.0000 0.0022 2.28 0.0242 278.5 0.0298 
Control Banks 0.0015 0.0000      
Ag Loans 1        
Sub. S Banks 0.0171 0.0000 0.0082 2.58 0.0109 371 0.0922 
Control Banks 0.0088 0.0000      
Ag Loans 2        
Sub. S Banks 0.0101 0.0000 0.0050 2.58 0.0107 363 0.0759 
Control Banks 0.0051 0.0000      
Ag Loans 3        
Sub. S Banks 0.0062 0.0000 0.0038 2.38 0.0187 242 0.0673 
Control Banks 0.0024 0.0000       
Common Dividends        
Sub. S Banks 0.0069 0.0051 0.0029 4.87 <0.0001 2576 <0.0001 
Control Banks 0.0039 0.0036      
Salaries        
Sub. S Banks 0.0164 0.0159 0.0005 1.17 0.2430 536 0.3446 
Control Banks 0.0160 0.0155      
Retained Earnings        
Sub. S Banks 0.0650 0.0522 0.0079 2.21 0.0284 707 0.212 











Table 12:      Tests of  Matching Criteria: Banks Converting to Subchapter S in 2001 
In 2001, 216 banks elected Subchapter S status.  After the matching 155 Sub.S banks remained in the 
sample.  The match is made in 1998, 3 years pre-event year.  Median values of the control groups are 
used for all calculations.  The variable Mean represents the mean value of the sample of banks that 
convert to Subchapter S in 2001 and the control groups.  Median represents the median value of the two 
groups at time of the match. Mean Dif represents the difference in the mean values of Subchapter S bank 
and the control banks.  All variables are divided by Total Assets (except Total Assets).   
                
Variables Mean Median Mean Dif t Value Pr > |t| Wilcoxon Pr > |S| 
Total Assets        
Sub. S Banks 74,916 48,250 469.74 1.38 0.1689 14 0.9801 
Control Banks 74,446 48,407      
SB Loans 1        
Sub. S Banks 0.0206 0.0103 0.0094 4.43 <0.0001 1318 <0.0001 
Control Banks 0.0112 0.0000      
SB Loans 2        
Sub. S Banks 0.0133 0.0032 0.0065 4.04 <0.0001 1145 0.0001 
Control Banks 0.0069 0.0000      
SB Loans 3        
Sub. S Banks 0.0174 0.0000 0.0085 3.63 0.0004 870.5 0.0006 
Control Banks 0.0088 0.0000      
Farm Loans 1        
Sub. S Banks 0.0102 0.0000 0.0074 4.72 <0.0001 1294 <0.0001 
Control Banks 0.0028 0.0000      
Farm Loans 2        
Sub. S Banks 0.0119 0.0000 0.0082 4.70 <0.0001 1181 <0.0001 
Control Banks 0.0037 0.0000      
Farm Loans 3        
Sub. S Banks 0.0073 0.0000 0.0058 4.64 <0.0001 992.5 <0.0001 
Control Banks 0.0015 0.0000      
Ag Loans 1        
Sub. S Banks 0.0250 0.0000 0.0169 4.51 <0.0001 1204.5 <0.0001 
Control Banks 0.0080 0.0000      
Ag Loans 2        
Sub. S Banks 0.0183 0.0000 0.0129 3.95 0.0001 940.5 <0.0001 
Control Banks 0.0054 0.0000      
Ag Loans 3        
Sub. S Banks 0.0129 0.0000 0.0097 3.73 0.0003 772 <0.0001 
Control Banks 0.0032 0.0000      
Common Dividends        
Sub. S Banks 0.0055 0.0049 0.0015 3.26 0.0014 1417 0.0087 
Control Banks 0.0040 0.0037      
Salaries        
Sub. S Banks 0.0161 0.0161 0.0007 1.88 0.0619 1183 0.0341 
Control Banks 0.0154 0.0152      
Retained Earnings        
Sub. S Banks 0.0633 0.0549 0.0038 1.15 0.2534 129 0.8186 









Table 13:     Tests of  Matching Criteria: Banks Converting to Subchapter S in 2002 
In 2002, 207 banks elected Subchapter S status.  After the matching 147 Sub.S banks remained in the 
sample.  The match is made in 1999, 3 years pre-event year.  Median values of the control groups are 
used for all calculations.  The variable Mean represents the mean value of the sample of banks that 
convert to Subchapter S in 2002 and the control groups.  Median represents the median value of the two 
groups at time of the match. Mean Dif represents the difference in the mean values of Subchapter S bank 
and the control banks.  All variables are divided by Total Assets (except Total Assets).   
                
Variables  Mean Median Mean Dif t Value Pr > |t| Wilcoxon Pr > |S| 
Total Assets        
Sub. S Banks 72,306 49,465 499.68 1.22 0.2252 451 0.385 
Control Banks 71,807 49,330      
SB Loans 1        
Sub. S Banks 0.0164 0.0049 0.0036 1.62 0.1069 552 0.0691 
Control Banks 0.0128 0.0023      
SB Loans 2        
Sub. S Banks 0.0098 0.0023 0.0023 1.60 0.1112 371.5 0.2098 
Control Banks 0.0075 0.0000      
SB Loans 3        
Sub. S Banks 0.0124 0.0000 0.0022 1.16 0.2467 321.5 0.2199 
Control Banks 0.0101 0.0000      
Farm Loans 1        
Sub. S Banks 0.0059 0.0000 0.0026 2.24 0.0267 528 0.0359 
Control Banks 0.0033 0.0000      
Farm Loans 2        
Sub. S Banks 0.0077 0.0000 0.0040 2.98 0.0034 717 0.0024 
Control Banks 0.0037 0.0000      
Farm Loans 3        
Sub. S Banks 0.0050 0.0000 0.0033 3.40 0.0009 485.5 0.0014 
Control Banks 0.0017 0.0000      
Ag Loans 1        
Sub. S Banks 0.0137 0.0000 0.0070 2.87 0.0047 513.5 0.0262 
Control Banks 0.0067 0.0000      
Ag Loans 2        
Sub. S Banks 0.0094 0.0000 0.0060 3.75 0.0003 685 0.0007 
Control Banks 0.0034 0.0000      
Ag Loans 3        
Sub. S Banks 0.0063 0.0000 0.0041 3.08 0.0025 409.5 0.0033 
Control Banks 0.0021 0.0000      
Common Dividends        
Sub. S Banks 0.0051 0.0038 0.0010 1.89 0.0603 685 0.1683 
Control Banks 0.0040 0.0033      
Salaries        
Sub. S Banks 0.0170 0.0166 0.0009 1.43 0.1537 719 0.1652 
Control Banks 0.0161 0.0158      
Retained Earnings        
Sub. S Banks 0.0619 0.0580 -0.0006 -0.16 0.8735 -29 0.9555 












Table 14:    Tests of  Matching Criteria: Banks Converting to Subchapter S in 2003 
In 2003, 194 banks elected Subchapter S status.  After the matching 123 Sub.S banks remained in the 
sample.  The match is made in 2000, 3 years pre-event year.  Median values of the control groups are 
used for all calculations.  The variable Mean represents the mean value of the sample of banks that 
convert to Subchapter S in 2003 and the control groups.  Median represents the median value of the two 
groups at time of the match. Mean Dif represents the difference in the mean values of Subchapter S bank 
and the control banks.  All variables are divided by Total Assets (except Total Assets).   
                
Variables  Mean Median Mean Dif t Value Pr > |t| Wilcoxon Pr > |S| 
Total Assets        
Sub. S Banks 96,507 59,727 58.99 0.10 0.9189 381.0 0.3383 
Control Banks 96,448 58,809        
SB Loans 1        
Sub. S Banks 0.0244 0.0172 0.0080 2.94 0.0039 874.5 0.0053 
Control Banks 0.0164 0.0140        
SB Loans 2        
Sub. S Banks 0.0132 0.0086 0.0031 1.84 0.0675 552.5 0.0773 
Control Banks 0.0101 0.0068        
SB Loans 3        
Sub. S Banks 0.0222 0.0110 0.0069 2.27 0.0250 610.0 0.0228 
Control Banks 0.0153 0.0044        
Farm Loans 1        
Sub. S Banks 0.0081 0.0000 0.0041 2.85 0.0052 520.0 0.0269 
Control Banks 0.0040 0.0000        
Farm Loans 2        
Sub. S Banks 0.0087 0.0000 0.0029 1.95 0.0531 307.0 0.1955 
Control Banks 0.0058 0.0000        
Farm Loans 3        
Sub. S Banks 0.0059 0.0000 0.0024 2.25 0.0265 255.0 0.1118 
Control Banks 0.0035 0.0000        
Ag Loans 1        
Sub. S Banks 0.0151 0.0000 0.0075 2.72 0.0074 485.5 0.0502 
Control Banks 0.0077 0.0000        
Ag Loans 2        
Sub. S Banks 0.0093 0.0000 0.0042 2.21 0.0291 416.5 0.0492 
Control Banks 0.0050 0.0000        
Ag Loans 3        
Sub. S Banks 0.0055 0.0000 0.0025 1.80 0.0751 291.5 0.0400 
Control Banks 0.0030 0.0000        
Common Dividends        
Sub. S Banks 0.0054 0.0036 0.0016 2.21 0.0290 472.0 0.2121 
Control Banks 0.0037 0.0033        
Salaries        
Sub. S Banks 0.0164 0.0158 0.0001 0.20 0.8379 218.0 0.5842 
Control Banks 0.0163 0.0157         
Retained Earnings        
Sub. S Banks 0.0578 0.0514 0.0018 0.47 0.6419 15.0 0.9700 










Table 15:    Tests of  Matching Criteria: Banks Converting to Subchapter S in 2004 
In 2004, 152 banks elected Subchapter S status.  After the matching 97 Sub.S banks remained in the 
sample.  The match is made in 2001, 3 years pre-event year.  Median values of the control groups are 
used for all calculations.  The variable Mean represents the mean value of the sample of banks that 
convert to Subchapter S in 2004 and the control groups.  Median represents the median value of the two 
groups at time of the match. Mean Dif represents the difference in the mean values of Subchapter S bank 
and the control banks.  All variables are divided by Total Assets (except Total Assets).   
                
Variables  Mean Median Mean Dif t Value Pr > |t| Wilcoxon Pr > |S| 
Total Assets        
Sub. S Banks 80,262 56,643 -485.22 -1.17 0.2453 -440.5 0.1134 
Control Banks 80,747 55,545      
SB Loans 1        
Sub. S Banks 0.0234 0.0193 0.0075 2.62 0.0103 523.5 0.0209 
Control Banks 0.0159 0.0149      
SB Loans 2        
Sub. S Banks 0.0122 0.0093 0.0017 1.13 0.2606 289 0.1992 
Control Banks 0.0104 0.0077      
SB Loans 3        
Sub. S Banks 0.0215 0.0110 0.0054 1.62 0.1083 366 0.0735 
Control Banks 0.0160 0.0062      
Farm Loans 1        
Sub. S Banks 0.0103 0.0000 0.0049 2.3 0.0237 333.5 0.0664 
Control Banks 0.0055 0.0003      
Farm Loans 2        
Sub. S Banks 0.0121 0.0000 0.0060 2.84 0.0054 336 0.0588 
Control Banks 0.0061 0.0000      
Farm Loans 3        
Sub. S Banks 0.0065 0.0000 0.0038 2.81 0.0061 270 0.0263 
Control Banks 0.0027 0.0000      
Ag Loans 1        
Sub. S Banks 0.0177 0.0000 0.0071 1.85 0.0673 316.5 0.0635 
Control Banks 0.0105 0.0001      
Ag Loans 2        
Sub. S Banks 0.0117 0.0000 0.0062 2.65 0.0095 345.5 0.0119 
Control Banks 0.0055 0.0000      
Ag Loans 3        
Sub. S Banks 0.0080 0.0000 0.0046 2.29 0.0240 271 0.0031 
Control Banks 0.0033 0.0000      
Common Dividends        
Sub. S Banks 0.0046 0.0034 0.0014 2.59 0.0110 779 0.0033 
Control Banks 0.0033 0.0027      
Salaries        
Sub. S Banks 0.0162 0.0155 -0.0001 -0.11 0.9124 -52.5 0.8513 
Control Banks 0.0162 0.0156      
Retained Earnings        
Sub. S Banks 0.0613 0.0528 0.0016 0.33 0.7389 -108.5 0.6984 




6.1.1.2 Agricultural Related Lending 
 The matching results presented in Tables 8 through 15 were fairly consistent 
across both production and land loans.  For all years and all origination amounts, 
Subchapter S banks provide a higher proportion of assets to agricultural lending.  This 
result is significant (0.10 level) for all origination amounts in years: 1997, 1998, 2000, 
2001, 2002, and 2004.  In years 1999 and 2003 the difference was significant for most of 
the origination amounts. 
6.1.1.3 Dividends  
 The statistical tests presented in Tables 8 through 15 revealed a significant (0.10 
level) difference three years before conversion betwe n the proportions of dividends paid 
by the two groups.  In all years, the amount of dividends paid by the banks that converted 
to Subchapter S status is greater than the proportin of assets paid as dividends by banks 
that remain as Subchapter C banks.  This difference is significant at the 0.10 level for all 
years under both t-test and Wilcoxon Sign-Ranked tests xcept 2002 and 2003, where it 
is only significant in one of the two tests. 
6.1.1.4 Salaries 
 The results presented in Tables 8 through 15 reporting the proportion of salaries 
paid out between the two groups provide mixed evidence.  In some of the years there was 
not a significant difference (0.10 level) between the wo groups.  The following years 
indicate a significant higher proportion of assets paid out in salaries by banks that 




6.1.1.5 Retained Earnings 
 Results presented in Tables 8 through 15 indicate that in most years there is no 
significant (0.10 level) difference before conversion between the two groups of banks.  
Banks that eventually converted to Subchapter S status had a higher proportion of 
retained earning relative to total assets in 1997, 1 98, and 2000. 
6.1.1.6 Interpretation of Matching Results 
 The results of the statistical analysis indicate that he matching process controlled 
well for size because there is not a significant difference between the two groups of banks 
in any of the years.  The results of the statistical analysis of the performance variables 
indicate that in most instances banks that later converted to Subchapter S had different 
performance characteristics from the control banks before conversion.  This is not 
surprising because previous studies suggest that banks that convert to Subchapter S are 
different from other banks before conversion (Gilbert and Wheelock, 2007; Cyree et al., 
2005; Hodder, et al., 2003; Harvey and Padget, 2000).  The results in Tables 8 through 15 
indicate that Subchapter S banks and C banks have different levels of the variables of 
interest before conversion.  As indicated by Barber and Lyon (1996), Lie (2001), and 
Alderson and Betker (2006) evaluating levels is notsufficient in detecting abnormal 
performance, evaluating changes is necessary for well sp cified results.  The present 
analysis investigates changes in performance by comparing the differences in Subchapter 
S banks and Subchapter C banks before and after conversion.  This approach should 




6.2 Results of Hypothesis Tests 
6.2.1 Hypothesis One Results  
Table 16 provides the results of the hypothesis test  for all three of the origination 
amounts of small business lending. 
6.2.1.1 Small Business Lending 1 
The results of the empirical analysis of abnormal and cumulative performance for 
small business lending with origination amounts les than $100,000 is presented in Table 
16, Panel A.    
The results reported in Panel A of Table 16 indicate significant (0.10 level) 
abnormal negative performance in all sub-event windows.  The (-3,-2) window shows a 
significant but modest decline in small business lending (Wilcoxon p-value 0.0071) after 
conversion.  This suggests that banks began to make odifications prior to conversion.   
The sub-window (-3,-1) indicates significant negative abnormal performance in small 
business lending (Wilcoxon p-value 0.0063).  Depending on when the bank made the 
Subchapter S election in the event year, the sub-window (-3,0) may capture the event tax 
benefit to varying degrees. Again, negative abnormal performance is detected (Wilcoxon 
p-value 0.0030).  The most dramatic decline in small business lending occurs in sub-
window (-3,1).  The negative abnormal performance doubles from -0.0011 to -0.0023 
(Wilcoxon p-value <0.0001).  This significant decline is interpreted as an effect of 
conversion.  Negative abnormal performance is detect d in both of the last two sub-
windows (-3,2) and (-3,3) (Wilcoxon p-value <0.0001, Wilcoxon p-value <0.0001).  The 
negative abnormal performance reported in Panel A of Table 16 suggests the proportion 






Table 16: Abnormal and Cumulative Abnormal Performance in Small Business Lending 
An evaluation of abnormal performance and cumulative abnormal performance in banks 
converting to Subchapter S from 1994 to 2004.  This is a sample of 1,658 of the 2,262 banks 
converted to Subchapter S during this time period. 
         
Panel A:  Abnormal Performance and Cumulative Abnormal Performance in  
Small Business Lending with origination amounts les than $100,000. 
                  
     AP CAP 
  AP   CAP   Wilcoxon p-value Wilcoxon p-value 
-2 -0.0008 *** -0.0008 *** -34547 0.0071 -34547 0.0071 
-1 -0.0010 *** -0.0018 *** -38308 0.0063 -39086 0.0057 
0 -0.0011 *** -0.0029 *** -43932.5 0.0030 -42562.5 0.0055 
1 -0.0023 *** -0.0052 *** -69505 <0.0001 -52933 0.0010 
2 -0.0033 *** -0.0085 *** -91889.5 <0.0001 -67688.5 <0.0001 
3 -0.0040 *** -0.0124 *** -103584 <0.0001 -79962 <0.0001 
         
         
         
Panel B:  Abnormal Performance and Cumulative Abnormal Performance in  
Small Business Lending with origination amounts between $100,000-$250,000. 
                  
     AP CAP 
  AP   CAP   Wilcoxon p-value Wilcoxon p-value 
-2 -0.0002  -0.0002  -16934.5 0.1637 -16934.5 0.1637 
-1 -0.0004 * -0.0006 * -24412.5 0.0694 -23306.5 0.0859 
0 -0.0006 * -0.0011   -23516.5 0.0992 -23568.5 0.1088 
1 -0.0007 *** -0.0018 * -38709 0.0092 -27097 0.0808 
2 -0.0010 *** -0.0028 ** -54538.5 0.0007 -36131 0.0299 
3 -0.0014 *** -0.0042 ** -66440.5 <0.0001 -44377 0.0103 
         
         
         
Panel C:  Abnormal Performance and Cumulative Abnormal Performance in  
Small Business Lending with origination amounts between $250,000-$1,000,000. 
                  
     AP CAP   
  AP   CAP   Wilcoxon p-value Wilcoxon p-value 
-2 -0.0002  -0.0002  -12732 0.2322 -12732 0.2322 
-1 -0.0002  -0.0004  -8792.5 0.4558 -12135 0.3069 
0 -0.0002  -0.0005  -5606 0.6596 -5595 0.6681 
1 -0.0003  -0.0009   -15712.5 0.2427 -6492 0.6436 
2 0.0004  -0.0004   -9944 0.4945 -4105 0.7863 




convert to Subchapter S.  A graphical illustration f the cumulative abnormal 
performance from Table 16, Panel A is provided in Figure 2 and visually reemphasizes 
the results of the abnormal performance.     
After converting to Subchapter S, banks provide a smaller proportion of their 
assets to small business loans with origination amounts less than $100,000.  The 
Wilcoxon Sign-Ranked test was significant in all sub-event windows.  Therefore the null 
hypothesis of no change in small business lending for this origination amount is rejected. 
Figure 2:  Cumulative Abnormal Performance 
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6.2.1.2 Small Business Lending 2 
The abnormal performance metrics for small business loans with origination 
amounts between $100,000 and $250,000 are presented in Table 16, Panel B.  The results 
indicate abnormal performance in most of the sub-event windows.  Significant negative 
abnormal performance occurs in sub-event windows (-3,-1),(-3,0),(-3,1),(-3,2), and (-3,3).  
After the conversion year, the negative abnormal performance declines from -0.0006 
(Wilcoxon p-value =0.0992) to -0.0014 (Wilcoxon p-value <0.0001).  This is reflected in 
Figure 3 and the cumulative abnormal performance.  There is a significant negative 
cumulative abnormal performance post event for this origination amount of small 
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business lending.  The null hypothesis under Hypothesis One of no change in small 
business lending is rejected.  This indicates the conversion did change the behavior of 
banks. 
Figure 3:  Cumulative Abnormal Performance  
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6.2.1.3 Small Business Lending 3 
 The abnormal and cumulative abnormal performance results for the largest 
origination amounts for small business lending, amounts between $250,000 and 
$1,000,000 are presented in Table 16, Pane1 C.  Theabnormal performance results 
indicate no significant difference between groups.  Although the cumulative abnormal 
performance results presented in Figure 4 illustrate an increase in lending by Subchapter 
S banks following conversion, this increase is not significant and the figure can not be 
presumed to have a pattern.  The analysis does not indicate significance in either 
abnormal or cumulative abnormal performance and we can not reject the null hypothesis 
of no change in small business lending for this origination amount.  Banks that convert to 
Subchapter S do not change their lending behavior for this origination amount of small 
business lending. 
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Figure 4:  Cumulative Abnormal Performance  
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6.2.1.4 Small Business Lending Summary  
The results of Table 16 indicate that for the smallest two origination amounts of 
small business lending, banks which experience a conversion event experience a 
significant decline in their small business lending.  For the largest category of small 
business lending, with origination amounts between $250,000 and $1,000,000 there is no 
change in their small business lending behavior.  Overall the null hypothesis is rejected 
for the smallest two origination amounts.  The declin  in small business lending could be 
attributed to banks changing their risk tolerance or a reallocation of these funds to 
dividends payments after conversion.  Detection of egative abnormal performance in the 
pre event sub-windows may indicate banks began reorganizing prior to conversion as 
found in previous research (Gilbert and Wheelock, 2007; Cyree et al., 2005; Hodder, et 
al., 2003; Harvey and Padget, 2000).   
6.3.1 Hypothesis Two Results  
 Hypothesis Two examines if banks change their lending to the agricultural sector 
after converting to Subchapter S.   Table 17 and Table 18 present the results of the 
analysis of abnormal and cumulative abnormal performance by banks.  Table 17 presents 
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the results of the statistical analysis for agricultural production loans and Table 18 
presents the results of the analysis of agricultural land loans. 
 
Table 17: Abnormal and Cumulative Abnormal Performance in Farm Lending 
An evaluation of abnormal performance and cumulative abnormal performance in the proportion 
of loans secured with farmland for banks converting o Subchapter S from 1994 to 2004.  This is a 
sample of 1,658 of the 2,262 banks converted to Subchapter S during this time period. 
         
Panel A:  Abnormal Performance and Cumulative Abnormal Performance in  
Farm Lending with origination amounts less than $100,0 0. 
                  
     AP CAP 
  AP   CAP   Wilcoxon p-value Wilcoxon p-value 
-2 -0.0001 ** -0.0001 ** -21520.5 0.0373 -21520.5 0.0373 
-1 -0.0007 *** -0.0008 *** -35250 0.0025 -33150.5 0.0049 
0 -0.0006 *** -0.0014 ** -37175 0.0028 -29783.5 0.0212 
1 -0.0010 *** -0.0024 *** 45292.5 0.0004 -36794 0.0079 
2 -0.0013 *** -0.0037 *** -58068 <0.0001 -44802.5 0.0027 
3 -0.0015 *** -0.0053 *** -71074.5 <0.0001 -51786.5 0.0010 
         
         
         
Panel B:  Abnormal Performance and Cumulative Abnormal Performance in  
Farm Lending with origination amounts between $100,0 -$250,000. 
                  
     AP CAP 
  AP   CAP   Wilcoxon p-value Wilcoxon p-value 
-2 0.0003  0.0003  -5104.5 0.5996 -5104.5 0.5996 
-1 0.0001 * 0.0004   -18971 0.0880 -14260.5 0.2051 
0 0.0006  0.0010   -4553 0.7030 -9027.5 0.4684 
1 0.0006  0.0016   -10616.5 0.3938 -7498.5 0.5755 
2 0.0005 * 0.0021   -25034.5 0.0647 -12212 0.4015 
3 0.0002 *** 0.0022   -36965.5 0.0098 -19009 0.2164 
         
         
         
Panel C:  Abnormal Performance and Cumulative Abnormal Performance in  
Farm Lending with origination amounts between $250,00 -$1,000,000. 
                  
     AP CAP 
  AP   CAP   Wilcoxon p-value Wilcoxon p-value 
-2 0.0003  0.0003  9036.5 0.1552 9036.5 0.1552 
-1 0.0004  0.0007   7606.5 0.3127 10273 0.1763 
0 0.0008  0.0014 * 13061.5 0.1304 17186 0.0580 
1 0.0011  0.0025 ** 14132.5 0.1344 22592 0.0264 
2 0.0014  0.0039 ** 16075.5 0.1298 25908.5 0.0248 





Table 18: Abnormal Performance in Agricultural Lending 
An evaluation of abnormal performance and cumulative abnormal performance in the proportion 
of loans to finance agricultural production for banks converting to Subchapter S from 1994 to 
2004.  This is a sample of 1,658 of the 2,262 banks converted to Subchapter S during this time 
period. 
         
Panel A:  Abnormal Performance and Cumulative Abnormal Performance in  
Agricultural Lending with origination amounts less than $100,000. 
                  
     AP CAP 
  AP   CAP   Wilcoxon p-value Wilcoxon p-value 
-2 -0.0009 ** -0.0009 ** -23339.5 0.0188 -23339.5 0.0188 
-1 -0.0022 *** -0.0031 *** -42569 0.0001 -41491 0.0002 
0 -0.0022 *** -0.0053 *** -44705 0.0002 -45442 0.0003 
1 -0.0031 *** -0.0084 *** -55448 <0.0001 -49974.5 0.0002 
2 -0.0038 *** -0.0122 *** -68056.5 <0.0001 -57379 <0.0001 
3 -0.0040 *** -0.0162 *** -76049.5 <0.0001 -63826.5 <0.0001 
         
         
         
Panel B:  Abnormal Performance and Cumulative Abnormal Performance in  
Agricultural Lending with origination amounts between $100,000-$250,000. 
                  
     AP CAP 
  AP   CAP   Wilcoxon p-value Wilcoxon p-value 
-2 -0.0002  -0.0002  -7455.5 0.3754 -7455.5 0.3754 
-1 -0.0004 ** -0.0006 * -24241.5 0.0120 -16282 0.0943 
0 -0.0003 ** -0.0010 ** -26819.5 0.0109 -24331.5 0.028 
1 -0.0007 *** -0.0017 ** -32367.5 0.0036 -28920 0.0153 
2 -0.0007 *** -0.0024 *** -40056 0.0007 -34584 0.0073 
3 -0.0007 *** -0.0031 *** -43591 0.0006 -36401.5 0.0080 
         
         
         
Panel C:  Abnormal Performance and Cumulative Abnormal Performance in  
Agricultural Lending with origination amounts between $250,000-$1,000,000. 
                  
     AP CAP 
  AP   CAP   Wilcoxon p-value Wilcoxon p-value 
-2 -0.0001  -0.0001  2398.5 0.6792 2398.5 0.6792 
-1 0.0001  -0.0000  -9726 0.1444 -2727 0.6858 
0 0.0004  0.0004  -2473 0.7407 -2120 0.7874 
1 0.0006  0.0011  3463 0.6657 2302.5 0.7908 
2 0.0010  0.0020  9394 0.2916 5488 0.5758 





6.3.1.1 Farm and Agricultural Lending 1  
 Table 17, Panel A provides the results of the hypothesis tests on loans secured 
with farmland with origination amounts less than $100,000.   Negative abnormal 
performance and negative cumulative abnormal performance is detected in all six sub-
event windows.  Abnormal performance is negative and becomes more negative as the 
event approaches and after conversion.  The abnormal performance was -0.0001 
(Wilcoxon p-value 0.0373) in sub-window (-3,-2) and had decreased to -0.0015 
(Wilcoxon p-value <0.0001) in sub-window (-3,3).   For origination amounts of the same 
size for loans to finance agricultural production the results are very similar (Table 18, 
Panel A).  In all sub-event windows, significant negative abnormal and cumulative 
abnormal performance is detected.  The abnormal performance is negative and significant 
in the first sub-event window (-3,-2) at -0.0009 (Wilcoxon p-value = 0.0188) and 
declined to -0.0040 (Wilcoxon p-value <0.0001).  The accumulation of these results is 
presented in Figure 5 and Figure 6.  These figures show a steady and significant decline 
in the proportion of agricultural related lending post event for this origination amount.  
 The results of negative abnormal performance for agricultural related lending in 
origination amounts less than $100,000 cause a rejection of the null hypothesis of no 
change in agricultural lending due to the conversion to Subchapter S.   
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6.3.1.2 Farm and Agricultural Lending 2 
 Table 17, Panel B and Table 18, Panel B provide the results of the hypothesis 
tests for the proportion of agricultural related loans with origination amounts between 
$100,000 and $250,000.  For loans secured with farmland, the abnormal performance is 
positive but becomes smaller in sub-windows (-3,2) and (-3,3).  Figure 7 illustrates the 
cumulative effect which becomes significant in the last two sub-windows 
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Figure 7:  Cumulative Abnormal Performance
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For loans to finance agricultural production, Table 18, the abnormal performance is 
significantly negative and becomes more negative through the time period analyzed.  In 
sub-event window (-3,-1) abnormal performance was -0.0004 (Wilcoxon p-value 0.0120) 
and decreased to -0.0007 (Wilcoxon p-value 0.0006).  Figure 8 depicts the cumulative 
abnormal performance and indicates a continuing andsignificant decline in the 
proportion of loans to finance agricultural production in origination amounts between 
$100,000 and $250,000. 
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The results of agricultural lending in origination amounts between $100,000 and 
$250,000 both reject the null hypothesis of no change due to the conversion, although the 
analysis produced some mixed results.  For loans secured with farmland Subchapter S 
banks increased their proportional lending, but for loans for agricultural production they 
decreased their lending.  One possible explanation is due to risk tolerance.  Loans secured 
with farmland provide collateral for the lending institution and thus a lower degree of risk 
than loans for agricultural production.   
6.3.1.3 Farm and Agricultural Lending 3 
 Table 17, Panel C provides the results of the abnormal performance for loans 
secured with farmland with origination amounts between $250,000 and $1,000,000.  The 
abnormal performance is not significant, although the cumulative abnormal performance 
is positive and becomes significant in post event sub-windows.  For instance, in sub-
window (-3, 0) cumulative abnormal performance is 0.0015 (Wilcoxon p-value 0.0580) 
and increases to 0.0054 in sub-window (-3,3) (Wilcoxon p-value 0.0320).  This is 
illustrated graphically in Figure 9. 
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For loans to finance agricultural production with the same origination amounts, Table 18, 
Panel, C, neither the abnormal performance nor the cumulative abnormal performance is 
significantly different from zero.  Although Figure 10 appears to indicate a significant 
increase in proportional lending post event, it is not significant.  The null hypothesis is 
not rejected which indicates banks do not change their lending for agricultural production 
for origination amounts between $250,000 and $1,000,000. 
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6.3.1.4 Agricultural Lending Summary  
The results indicate significant negative abnormal lending proportions in many of 
the agricultural lending levels.  For loans to finance agricultural production there has 
been a significant decline for origination amounts up to $250,000.  For loans secured with 
farmland there appears to be a slight increase in the amount of loans provide with larger 
origination amounts, but a significant decline in loans with originations less than 
$100,000.  The finding of the first two hypotheses t nds to refute the idea that the tax 
advantage is being passed onto the local community through an increase in lending.  
Rather, the results indicate a change in the risk tolerance of banks or a redistribution of 
funds to increase dividends. 
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6.4.1 Hypothesis Three Results  
The third hypothesis further examines if banks change their behavior after 
conversion.  The two previous hypotheses evaluate if lending to small businesses or the 
agricultural industry by banks converting to Subchapter S is impacted.  More specifically, 
these hypotheses investigate what the banks are doing with their tax benefit.  As indicated 
in the previous results sections, banks decrease their lending to most of these areas after 
the conversion event.  Therefore, the third hypothesis xplores further where the tax 
benefit is being distributed.   
 Since the owners are taxed on all income under Subchapter S, versus only on 
dividends paid under Subchapter C, this hypothesis xplores if the owners receive an 
increase in dividends to offset this increase in taxes paid by the owners.  In preparation 
for conversion, banks decrease their dividends to increase the tax advantage post 
conversion (Hodder et al., 2003).   
The abnormal and cumulative abnormal performance in the proportion of 
dividends paid by banks which convert to Subchapter S is provided in Table 19.  The 
table indicates a steady and dramatic increase in the proportion of dividends paid by 
Subchapter S banks. In event sub-window (-3,-1) abnormal performance was significant 
at 0.0012 (Wilcoxon p-value <0.0001).  The event effect increases dramatically in the 
event year (-3,0) to 0.0041 (Wilcoxon p-value <0.001) and then continues a modest 






Table 19: Abnormal and Cumulative Abnormal Performance in Dividends 
An evaluation of abnormal performance and cumulative abnormal performance in the proportion of 
dividends for banks converting to Subchapter S from 1994 to 2004.  This is a sample of 1,658 of 
the 2,262 banks converted to Subchapter S during ths time period. 
                  
     AP CAP 
  AP   CAP   Wilcoxon p-value Wilcoxon p-value 
-2 0.0001  0.0001  -3972 0.4183 -3972 0.4183 
-1 0.0012 *** 0.0013 *** 73950.5 <0.0001 74418.5 <0.0001 
0 0.0041 *** 0.0054 *** 390341 <0.0001 288110 <0.0001 
1 0.0059 *** 0.0114 *** 495011.5 <0.0001 402770.5 <0.0001 
2 0.0055 *** 0.0169 *** 470851 <0.0001 442988.5 <0.0001 
3 0.0051 *** 0.0221 *** 441910.5 <0.0001 460461.5 <0.0001 
 
The event effect is depicted in Figure 11 which emphasizes the cumulative effect 
in the change in dividends.  This indicates that after the event of converting, banks 
increase their dividends to the shareholders.  These r ults are consistent with previous 
research and confirm the expected performance of banks that convert to Subchapter S 
status.   








-2 -1 0 1 2 3
 
To explore if the increase in dividends is greater than what is necessary to offset 
the increase in taxes, additional analysis is performed.  The pre conversion dividend 
payout ratio was applied to the three year post conversion net income.  The highest 
marginal individual and the dividend tax rate were th n used to determine what the 
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shareholders would have received if taxed under Subchapter C.  This amount is then 
compared to what the shareholders actually received under Subchapter S.22  Wilcoxon 
Sign-Ranked tests and t-tests examine if there is a significant difference between the 
payouts.  The results indicate Subchapter S banks pay a significantly higher amount of 
dividends then what is necessary to offset the increase in tax expense (Refer to Table 20).   
Table 20 : Evaluation of Dividend Payout 
The sample of 1,658 banks that convert to Subchapter S were analyzed three years post 
conversion to evaluate if the proportion of dividens paid was more than necessary to offset 
the additional tax expenses.  Mean represents the mean value of dividends received under 
each tax structure.  Median represents the median value of dividends received.  Mean Dif 
represents the mean difference between the amount of dividends received and what was 
expected had the bank remained under Subchapter C.  All values are in 000s. 
        
  
Mean Median Mean 
Dif 
t Value Pr > |t| Wilcoxon Pr > |S| 
S Tax 691.16 362.723 123.03 3.8971 0.0001 164705 <0.0001 
C Tax 568.13 261.67      
        
The highest individual marginal tax rate was 39.6% from 1994-2000; 39.1% in 2001; 38.6% 
in 2002 and 35% from 2002-2008. 
        
The dividend tax rate was 15% from 2002-2008. 
 
 
6.5.1 Hypothesis Four Results 
Hypothesis Four evaluates if banks that convert to Subchapter S tax status 
significantly change their salary distributions.  The abnormal and cumulative abnormal 
performance results in Table 21 indicate a significant decline in salaries post event.  The 
abnormal performance in sub-window (-3.-2) is insigif cant at -0.0000 (Wilcoxon p-
value 0.1932) but becomes significant in the event y ar (-3,0), at -0.0004 (Wilcoxon p-
                                                
22 For example, the dividends of banks that converted to Subchapter S in 1997 were analyzed in 2000.  A 
pre conversion dividend payout ratio was applied along with the individual tax rate of 39.6% to determine 
what the shareholders would have received under Subchapter C.  This value is compared to what the 
shareholders actually received.  This value is based upon dividends received minus net income taxed at the 
individual rate of 39.6%.  Subchapter S shareholders are taxed on all income, whether or not distributed as 
dividends.   
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value <0.0001).  This abnormal performance continues to decline to -0.0005 in sub-event 
window (-3,3).   
Table 21: Abnormal and Cumulative Abnormal Performance in Salaries 
An evaluation of abnormal performance and cumulative abnormal performance in the proportion of 
salaries paid by banks converting to Subchapter S from 1994 to 2004.  This is a sample of 1,658 of 
the 2,262 banks converted to Subchapter S during ths time period. 
     AP CAP 
  AP   CAP   Wilcoxon p-value Wilcoxon p-value 
-2 -0.0000  -0.0000  -25377.5 0.1932 -25377.5 0.1932 
-1 -0.0000  -0.0001  -3769.5 0.8468 -11938.5 0.5405 
0 -0.0004 *** -0.0005 ** -79654.5 <0.0001 -44368.5 0.0228 
1 -0.0005 *** -0.0010 *** -78606.5 <0.0001 -63526.5 0.0011 
2 -0.0005 *** -0.0015 *** -84021.5 <0.0001 -72229.5 0.0002 
3 -0.0005 *** -0.0020 *** -66554.5 0.0006 -75834.5 <0.0001 
 
The cumulative abnormal performance in Figure 12 is negative and significant 
post event.  This contradicts the analysis of Gilbert and Wheelock’s (2007) who find no 
significant difference in salary expense by banks converting to Subchapter S.  The results 
of my analysis could indicate that salaries have prviously been used as a means of 
extracting funds from the banks and avoiding the double tax but now this tactic is no 
longer necessary.  Another possible explanation could be due to the decrease in small 
origination amount lending, fewer employees/loan officers are needed.  The results of 
negative abnormal performance reject the null hypothesis of no change.  These results 
indicate conversion to Subchapter S changes the behavior of banks.   
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6.6.1 Hypothesis Five Results 
 The tests of Hypothesis Five explore if the tax benefit received by conversion to 
Subchapter S influences the banks retained earnings.  Table 22 provides the results of the 
hypothesis tests and indicates a significant change i  the behavior of banks that elect to 
convert to Subchapter S.   
Table 22: Abnormal and Cumulative Abnormal Performance in Retained Earnings 
An evaluation of abnormal performance and cumulative abnormal performance in the proportion of 
retained earning by banks converting to Subchapter S from 1994 to 2004.  This is a sample of 1,658 
of the 2,262 banks converted to Subchapter S during th s time period. 
                  
     AP CAP 
  AP   CAP   Wilcoxon p-value Wilcoxon p-value 
-2 0.0007 *** 0.0007 *** 78227.5 <0.0001 78227.5 <0.0001 
-1 -0.0010  -0.0003   -14438.5 0.2295 15085.5 0.2197 
0 -0.0021 ** -0.0024  -40561.5 0.0188 -15863.5 0.2080 
1 -0.0032 *** -0.0056 ** -87898.5 <0.0001 -44002.5 0.0120 
2 -0.0041 *** -0.0097 *** -110782 <0.0001 -64175.5 <0.0001 
3 -0.0045 *** -0.0141 *** -118514 <0.0001 -77557.5 <0.0001 
 
A decline in retained earnings is indicated by a significant negative abnormal 
performance.  Sub-event window (-3,0) indicates the approximate start of the event.  In 
this window abnormal performance is -0.0021 (Wilcoxon p-value 0.0188).  The 
following three sub-event windows all indicate a steady decline in the proportion of 
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retained earnings by banks converting to Subchapter S status.  In the last sub-window 
analyzed (-3,3), abnormal performance in retained earnings declined to -0.0045 
(Wilcoxon p-value <0.0001).   Table 21 also provides the cumulative abnormal 
performance results which illustrate a significant change in banks retention of earnings 
post event.  Figure 13 provides a visual presentation of how banks behavior changed post 
event.  Cumulative abnormal performance is negative and significant in periods 1, 2, and 
3.  These results allow us to reject the null hypothesis and indicate that banks may be 
using their retained earning to increase the dividends paid to shareholders.  This also 
confirms previous findings of a decline in capital levels after conversion (Harvey and 
Padget, 2000). 






















CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
 
7.1 Conclusions  
Banks first became eligible to elect Subchapter S tax status in 1997.  As of 
January 1, 2008 there are 2,345 Subchapter S banks.  Converting from Subchapter C 
status of the IRC to Subchapter S status allows an organization the opportunity to avoid 
double taxation.  Earnings are passed through to the owners, with the avoidance of the 
corporate tax.  The owners are taxed on all earnings whether or not they are distributed as 
dividends, foreseeably increasing their individual tax burden.   
 This study utilizes an event study approach using accounting data to detect any 
abnormal changes occurring due to the conversion to Subchapter S.  An adequate control 
group is created by expanding on the matching technique from Barber and Lyon (1996).  
Non-parametric Wilcoxon Sign-Ranked tests are utilized to detect abnormal performance 
by the converting banks.   
An examination of banks converting to Subchapter S tax status between 1997 and 
2004 reveal some interesting results.  Results support the distribution of the tax savings to 
shareholders in the form of an increase in dividends.  This expected result indicates banks 
are trying to compensate shareholders for the increase in taxes due to conversion to 
Subchapter S.  Additional analysis indicates Subchapter S banks increase their dividends    
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more than necessary to compensate shareholders for their increase in tax expense. 
Results also indicate a decline in retained earnings by converting banks.  Positive 
abnormal performance is detected prior to the conversion, but after conversion negative 
abnormal performance is found.  This confirms findings that banks decrease their capital 
levels after conversion (Harvey and Padget, 2000).  The decrease in retained earnings 
after conversion coincides with the increase in dividends. 
Negative abnormal performance is detected in the proportion of salaries expense.  
Banks converting to Subchapter S significantly reduce their salary expense, which could 
indicate that salaries were previously used as an ave ue for extracting funds from the 
bank while avoiding double taxation.  
 Evaluation of lending activities by banks converting to Subchapter S produced 
mixed results.  Only for loans secured with farmland with origination amounts greater 
than $100,000 is there positive abnormal performance.  For both categories of 
agricultural lending with origination amounts less than $100,000 and for loans to finance 
agricultural production with origination amounts betw en $100,000 through $250,000 
negative abnormal performance is detected.  Negative abnormal performance is also 
discovered in small business lending with origination amounts less than $250,000.  This 
does not support arguments provided by various bank groups which state converting to 
Subchapter S increases lending to this sector.  Onepossible explanation for the decreases 
in small business and agricultural related lending, primarily in small origination amounts, 
is due to a reduction in risk tolerance by banks converting to Subchapter S tax status.  
These informationally opaque loans are often considered riskier to the financial 
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institution.  Another explanation is banks are diverting funds from small business and 
agricultural related lending to increase dividends. 
7.2 Contributions of this Research 
 This is the first study to evaluate conversion to Subchapter S tax status by 
commercial banks in an event study framework.  Evaluation of banks converting to 
Subchapter S from three years before conversion to three years after provides a unique 
perspective on the conversion effect.  Utilizing a multi-dimensional matching technique 
results in a more comprehensive and thorough analysis of the effect of the Subchapter S 
tax benefit. 
The results of this research contradict claims made by various banking related 
groups.  These groups assert that by providing banks with this tax advantage the banks 
can then reach out to their communities including small businesses and the agricultural 
industry.   
The results of this study address five different hypotheses to try to explain what 
impact the conversion to Subchapter S status has on banks.  This event study finds that 
banks that convert to Subchapter S status are primarily utilizing the tax savings to 
increase the proportion of dividends paid to their shareholders.  Thus the benefit of the 
tax savings is not going to the customers or the employees, but to the 
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